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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 31 March 2010 the ten Member States of Western European Union (WEU)
announced that the last organs, staffs and activities of that institution would be
laid to rest by 30 June 2011. Having resiled from the Modified Brussels Treaty
(MBT) of 1954 which created WEU as a successor to the Western Union of
1948, these nations are now working to dispose of the staff, premises and
archives at WEU’s Brussels offices and its Parliamentary Assembly in Paris. Lit-
tle public interest has been shown in these moves, perhaps because WEU’s oper-
ational and political work had already been taken over by the European Union
(EU), in the frame of its new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), at
the end of 1999.
Why get rid of WEU’s last vestiges precisely now? This study addresses the ques-
tion, and seeks to assess WEU’s achievements and legacies by reviewing its
57-year career from cradle to grave. Modest though WEU’s own role may have
been, it has been intimately linked with one of the great policy challenges of the
post-war world: the search for a distinct and effective form of ‘European
defence’.
The original Brussels Treaty of 1948, creating a permanent guaranteed defence
relationship between the UK, France and the Benelux countries, was a vital step
towards the realization of the North Atlantic Alliance. When the attempt to
create an even more deeply integrated European Defence Community including
Germany broke down in 1954, WEU was created as a self-confessed pis aller. Its
treaty, the MBT, still contained absolute mutual guarantees but from the start
WEU left the operative work of defence to NATO. It fulfilled useful tasks in
cementing the post-war order, but then sank into slumber until the mid-1980s.
When first reawakened, it became a talking-shop for a core group of West Euro-
peans, helping them cope with the trans-Atlantic strains of the time and devel-
oping some sense of Europe’s shared and distinct security interests.
During the 1990s, WEU had to reinvent itself in face of demands for post-Cold
War enlargement and new-style crisis management operations. It was further
steered by the evolving needs of the EU and NATO, for whom it came to serve
as intermediary. Its low profile and flexibility let it bring the enlargement candi-
dates and European non-Allies, as well as non-EU members of NATO, closely
into its work from an early date. It invented a definition (‘Petersberg formula’)
for crisis management tasks that could realistically be carried out by Europeans
alone; and it built intricate partnerships with both NATO and the EU that in
theory allowed NATO’s military assets to be borrowed for missions under an
EU political lead. However, the only operations actually launched under a WEUDEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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flag were loosely coordinated naval ones, and police and other civilian actions.
WEU never enjoyed the political status or trust in capitals to be seriously con-
sidered for more demanding military tasks, even when European coalitions were
in the lead.
Frustration with this situation, and with the weak show made by European
capabilities under a NATO flag, drove Britain and France in 1998 to propose
giving the EU its own military arm. The formula adopted for this in Helsinki at
end-1999 limited EU actions to the ‘Petersberg’ crisis management and human-
itarian spectrum, thus avoiding a direct clash with NATO and allowing the EU’s
non-Allied members to participate fully. The non-EU European Allies, however,
lost status compared with WEU and this led to Turkish blocking tactics for the
first years of ESDP, delaying the first ESDP operations (in Former Yugoslavia)
to 2003. Nevertheless the bulk of WEU’s functions were transferred to EU
equivalents, leaving a residual secretariat to guard the MBT. The WEU Institute
for Security Studies and Satellite Centre became EU agencies and a few years
later, the two WEU-linked armament cooperation bodies WEAG and WEAO
were superseded by the EU’s European Defence Agency.
Economy-minded nations were pondering a final close-down of WEU as early
as 2004, but the decisive move came in February 2010 following entry into force
of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. This text contains (Article 42.7) a pledge by all 27 EU
members to assist each other against military attack, but – contrasting with the
MBT’s clarity – the language is heavily qualified by references to NATO’s pri-
macy and respect for the non-Allies’ status. Prompted by the UK with arguments
for cost-saving, the WEU powers nevertheless agreed in March 2010 that this
development made the MBT redundant. Behind their decision seems to lie an
acceptance that the European defence idea can be pushed no further in the EU
framework, at least for the foreseeable future. NATO still plays the beau rôle in
‘hard’ peace missions as well as territorial defence, and commands more atten-
tion even from the French military than a European Union handicapped by Ger-
man (and other) misgivings. The Franco-British defence treaty of November
2010 signals a certain impatience with all institutional constraints, as well as the
severity of post-2008 budget pressures.
An initial post mortem on WEU’s achievements could give credit for its role in
early post-war consolidation; for its political services both to a European secu-
rity identity and to trans-Atlantic harmony from the 80s onwards; and its help
in cementing common approaches especially to crisis management missions
across the wider Europe. Its ‘Petersberg’ formula has stood the test of time and
remains at the heart of EU Treaty provisions on practical defence cooperation.
The WEU Institute and Satcen have discovered wider horizons under EU owner-DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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ship, while WEAO in particular showed a way forward in the still problematic
field of defence industrial collaboration. In the military and operational sphere
WEU’s acquis was drawn upon extensively and usefully, where appropriate,
during ESDP’s formative period, though for obvious reasons this was not high-
lighted at the time. This acquis included planning in the operational, logistic,
command and control, communications and force generation fields; the con-
struction of intelligence and situational awareness capabilities; the design of cri-
sis management, exercise and training procedures; and the experience of mount-
ing the first (modest) Petersberg-style operation – MAPE in Albania.
The EU has proved unable to absorb, let alone improve upon, three things from
WEU’s legacy: the true collective defence guarantees of the MBT, the openness
to Turkey and other non-EU Allies, and the maintenance of a specialized parlia-
mentary assembly for defence and security (which will be replaced, at best, by a
much weaker inter-parliamentary network). In all other respects European
defence and security cooperation has clearly fared much better under the EU’s
wing than it ever could in WEU, producing more than 20 actual crisis operations
for a start. If the EU now finds itself unable to move further, there are at least
two possible hopeful readings of the post-WEU situation. One is that the EU and
its members will be spurred to greater and more integrated defence efforts by
some future set of challenges, distinct from 20th-century territorial warfare. The
other reading is that the EU’s nature, values, longer-term survival and true secu-
rity potential are better served without a ‘hard’ military personality. The kind of
European defence that WEU and its Treaty stood for has proved elusive after
nearly 60 years of effort: could it also be, in the final analysis, unnecessary and
undesirable?7
1. INTRODUCTION: DEATH WITHOUT CLOSURE?
Edmond Rostand’s play ‘L’Aiglon’ (The Eaglet) depicts the ill-fated son of Napo-
leon Bonaparte and his second, Habsburg wife dying young in an Austrian pal-
ace. Calling for his cradle to be brought close alongside his death-bed, he
exclaims ‘My life is there in the crack between them! And in that narrow crack,
all too narrow and dark, fate has not dropped even a single pin of glory’.1 The
institution called Western European Union (WEU) was granted a longer life than
Franz von Reichstadt, starting with its predecessor Western Union in 1948 and
facing final closure only in 2011. Most of those who know it would be tempted
to say, however, that the gleam of glory has been equally absent from its history:
and that like Napoleon’s heir, it was ‘greater in the cradle’ than ever in its subse-
quent tale. But even the unrealized life deserves a requiem, and in this study a first
attempt will be made to review and assess WEU’s story from cradle to grave.
The spur for such a retrospective is clear: on 31 March 2010 the Council com-
posed of the ten Member States of WEU announced that the last organs, staffs
and activities of the institution would be terminated by 30 June 2011.2 To clear
the way, all these nations – Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the UK – have already completed pro-
cedures to denounce (withdraw from) the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 that
brought WEU into being. These steps, though taken in public and sometimes
involving parliaments, have attracted remarkably little attention perhaps
because most of Europe’s security élite assumed WEU was finished already. Fol-
lowing the Helsinki European Council decisions of December 1999 establishing
a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Union (EU) took
over all political and operational functions of WEU, leaving it by 2001 with just
a minimal central staff, two armaments-related organs, and a parliamentary
Assembly still operating. The armaments bodies, WEAG and WEAO, were
closed in 2005 and 2006 respectively in response to the creation of the EU’s
European Defence Agency. The Assembly re-named itself the European Security
and Defence Assembly and has continued working with its base in Paris, but is
obliged to close as part of the March 2010 decisions and has planned a final,
ceremonial event in Brussels for May 2011. These final closures are thus the last
of several coups de grâce that have drained the life from a never particularly
vibrant organization.
1. Authors’ translation from the original French: “Ma vie est là, dans la ruelle. Et le sort…Dans la ruelle
mince – oh! Trop mince et trop noire! N’a pu laisser tomber une épingle de gloire”. Edmond Rostand,
l’Aiglon, Act VI scene 1. Curiously, the image of WEU as a ‘sickly, sleepy infant’ (‘un enfant malingre et
somnolent’) was used as early as 25 January 1955 in a critical article written for La nouvelle gazette by
G.-N. Dorgez.
2. Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Par-
ties to the Modified Brussels Treaty, Brussels, 31 March 2010, text at www.weu.int/Declaration_E.pdf.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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This paper will re-tell the story from the first days of WEU, in a brief historical
introduction (section II) that aims to situate it in the broad weave and weft of
security building and integration processes in Europe. Next, in section III, the
latter phases of WEU revival from 1992 through to 1999 will be looked at more
closely to trace how far and in what way they set the scene for the eventual EU
take-over. Section IV describes the phases of that take-over up to the last prac-
tical details of termination in 2011. From this point onwards the paper moves
into more analytical mode, starting by asking why the final death-knell should
sound for WEU precisely in 2010-11 (Section V). The pivotal, and lengthy, Sec-
tion VI attempts to draw a final balance-sheet of what WEU achieved and failed
to achieve: what useful legacies it left for its successors, and what – if anything
– was lost to the world with its passing. The closing Section VII comments
briefly on the broader consequences and prospects for European defence.
One more remark may be needed on the nature and aims of this study. It will
not be a personal memoir, nor concerned with personalities, even if both authors
have been employed at WEU during momentous times.3 It does not pretend to
supply a theoretical framework for understanding WEU’s fate, nor can it do
justice to the fascinating legal issues surrounding the closure of an international
organization.4 It is written in the mode of empirical policy analysis, on the basis
mainly of primary sources, the authors’ experiences, and a total of 20 structured
interviews5 conducted with national and institutional officials and other experts
from January-April 2011.6 It thus leaves enormous scope for further studies on
the subject and, it may be hoped, will play some part in stimulating them.
Alyson JK Bailes and Graham Messervy-Whiting7
3. Alyson Bailes served as Political Director of WEU from 1996-1999, and had dealt with aspects of Euro-
pean defence policy as a British diplomat since the 1980s, notably while Head of FCO Security Policy
Department in 1994-96. During Graham Messervy-Whiting’s Armed Forces career he held the posts of
Director of the Western European Union’s Planning Cell from 1995-98, adviser to Javier Solana on the
establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy from 2000-01, and then the first Chief of Staff
of the new EU Military Staff from 2001-03.
4. For a recent treatment see Ramses A. Wessel, ‘Dissolution and Succession: The Transmigration of the
Soul of International Organizations’ in J. Klabbers (ed.), Research Handbook on the Law of International
Organizations, Edward Elgar Publishers: Cheltenham, 2008.
5. These interviews took place on the understanding that interlocutors would not be named in this paper
nor specific remarks attributed to them. Their testimony has been especially important in constructing
sections V-VII below.
6. The authors wish to extend special thanks to the WEU Secretariat-General, the President and staff of
the WEU Assembly, the Flemish Peace Institute, and all those who were interviewed for or helped to
review this paper.
7. Alyson Bailes is a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland, and at the
College of Europe in Bruges. Graham Messervy-Whiting is a Senior Honorary Research Fellow in the
University of Birmingham’s School of Government and Society.9
2. WEU AS ‘THE’ EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
INSTITUTION, 1948-19918
The broadest way to frame the history of WEU9 is to link it with the concept of
‘European defence’: a phrase that enshrines both the organization’s highest aspi-
rations, and its ultimately fatal contradictions. ‘European defence’ in a 20th-
century context combined the two most innovative Big Ideas of the post-World
War Two period, both inspired by wartime experience – permanent collective
defence, and a uniquely far- and deep-reaching new style of multi-state integra-
tion. The problem lay, and still lies today, in marrying the two notions. Defend-
ing Europe, at least in ‘hard’ military and territorial terms, has only been found
feasible so far in a trans-Atlantic framework including the USA. Applying the
full rigour of the European model of integration, with its pooling of resources
under collective or supranational management and consequent modification of
sovereignty, to military defence has so far proved a bridge too far for the Euro-
peans themselves, let alone for North Americans.
The vicissitudes of the European defence idea, in all its guises and component
parts, provide the simplest explanation for why WEU began life as a pis aller
and continued as a stop-gap, a ‘reserve’10 and an odd-job institution. The story
started, however, in a very different spirit with the signature of the first Brussels
Treaty by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK on 17
March 1948. Containing an unconditional mutual defence commitment and
8. This and the following two sections (including three chronological tables) draw upon Why can we get
rid of Western European Union? European Collective Security and the Modified Brussels Treaty, a BA
thesis presented at the University of Iceland in January 2011 by Örvar Þorri Rafnsson, to whom the
authors convey their thanks. The text is accessible at http://skemman.is/item/view/1946/7269;jsessio-
nid=C7BB5D2ADF67E1C4349E03D4260E9AFD.
9. The history of WEU has been made accessible for research by a multimedia archive created by Euro-
pean Navigator at the Centre Virtuel de Connaissances de l’Europe (CVCE) of the University of Luxem-
bourg – http://www.ena.lu – subsuming the early records held at the UK Public Records Office in Kew,
and supplementing WEU’s own material at http://www.weu.int. The CVCE archive includes a full bibliog-
raphy, but the following reference works/compilations have been found particularly useful: Arie Bloed
and Ramses A Wessel (eds.), The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU), Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1994; Anne Deighton (ed.), Western European Union 1954-1997:
Defence, Security, Integration, St Antony’s College: Oxford, 1997; Anne Deighton and Eric Remacle
(eds.), The Western European Union, 1948-1998: from the Brussels Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam
(special edition of Studia Diplomatica, Brussels, Vol. LI: 1998, Nos. 1-2, Brussels, 1998); Guido Lenzi
(ed.), weu.@.fifty, WEU-ISS: Paris, 1998; WEU Secretariat-General, Western European Union: A Euro-
pean Journey (privately published: Brussels, 1998); and André Dumoulin and Eric Remacle, L’Union de
l’Europe Occidentale: Phénix de la défense européenne, Éditions Bruylant: Brussels, 1998. For the period
after 1999, the Assembly’s privately published The European Defence Debate 1955-2005 (Paris, 2005)
and André Dumoulin, Union de l’Europe Occidentale: La Déstructuration (1998-2006), Éditions Bruy-
lant: Paris, 2005, are indispensable sources.
10. The term ‘reserve organization’ is found in Willem van Eekelen, ‘WEU Missions and Cooperation
with NATO – Comments’ in Deighton and Remacle, The Western European Union, 1948-1998, as note 9
above. Another telling epithet is the institution of ‘missed opportunities’ (WEU Assembly, The European
Defence Debate 1955-2005, as note 9 above, p. 77).DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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establishing a ‘Western Union’ with concrete elements of joint military organi-
zation (command structures, joint air defence), this Treaty made multilateral,
permanent, collective defence a reality in Europe for the first time in history. It
provided the European foundation on which NATO was to be created through
the Treaty of Washington signed with the USA and Canada on 4 April 1949,
when Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal also became members (to
be followed by Greece and Turkey in 1952). Tellingly, however, in December
1950 when NATO’s own permanent defence structures started to take shape
with the appointment of a European supreme commander (SACEUR), the Brus-
sels Treaty powers decided that their joint military activities should be incorpo-
rated into and henceforth carried out through the Atlantic Alliance.
The notion of (Western) Europe as a separate ‘hard’ defence community was
not, however, to be quite so rapidly strangled at birth. The early 1950s were the
time when the even more revolutionary idea of supranational integration began
to take on flesh in Franco-German plans for the European Communities. They
were also dominated by debate over how to bring a recovering, democratized,
Federal Republic of Germany into Western structures, as much to seal its own
redemption as to strengthen the front against Communist encroachment in the
heart of Europe. In September 1950, French Prime Minister René Pleven sug-
gested applying the ‘European’ method par excellence by creating a European
Defence Community (EDC) with a single multinational force structure including
German forces under central command. The Treaty of Paris signed on 23 May
1952 embodied this idea but, like the Treaties creating the three original Euro-
pean Communities, did not include the UK – nor indeed, the ‘flank’ countries of
Europe’s North and South.11
Table 1: Chronology of European Defence and Integration, 1945-1955
11. The signatories were Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands
May 1945 End of World War II in Europe.
September 1946 Winston Churchill’s ‘United States of Europe’ speech.
March 1947 Britain and France sign Dunkirk Treaty on mutual defence against
Germany.
September  1947 United States and Latin American countries sign the Rio Treaty
(Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) on mutual defence
against external attacks.
March 1948 Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg sign the
Brussels Treaty on mutual defence. The Western Union is subse-
quently established.
June 1948 Berlin blockade begins.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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Thus for just over two years, it looked as if the architecture of free Europe would
consist of a political, economic and military hard core of six fully integrated
states, with an outer ring of other Europeans, and two North American powers,
linked by inter-governmental obligations in the defence field only. But on 30
August 1954, the French National Assembly showed it was not ready for such
close and exclusive interdependence with Germany by voting for a motion
rejecting the EDC. In the weeks of hurried diplomacy that followed, the British
Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden played a key role in seeking a solution that
would save European face while shifting the defence agenda – including the
military integration of West Germany – firmly back into the Atlantic frame-
work. Already in September and with the USA and Canada as witnesses, the five
European signatories of the Brussels Treaty agreed to invite both Germany and
Italy to join them. On 23 October at Paris, a set of instruments were signed that
came to be known as the Modified Brussels Treaty12 and which among other
things established the organization Western European Union (WEU). One year
later the Federal Republic of Germany was received into NATO.
June 1948 United States Senate passes the ‘Vandenberg resolutions’ allowing
the US to enter into regional defence pacts.
October 1948 Brussels  Treaty  Organization approves plan for ‘North Atlantic
Defence Pact’.
April 1949 Brussels Treaty Organization, the United States, Canada, Italy, Por-
tugal, Denmark, Norway and Iceland sign the Washington Treaty
(NATO Treaty) on mutual defence.
May 1949 Treaty of London (Statute of the Council of Europe) establishes the
Council of Europe.
May 1950 Robert Schuman presents proposal (Schuman Declaration) to cre-
ate a supranational functional community in Europe.
October 1950 René Pleven presents his proposal (Pleven Plan) for a European
Defence Community
December 1950 NATO opens itself to a German contribution. End of ‘occupied’ sta-
tus of (West) Germany.
April 1951 Treaty of Paris establishes the European Coal and Steel Community.
February 1952 Turkey and Greece join NATO.
May 1952 European Defence Community Treaty signed.
August 1954 French National Assembly rejects European Defence Community.
October 1954 Brussels Treaty amended to establish the Western European Union
and to include membership of Germany.
May 1955 (West) Germany joins NATO.
12. Text at www.weu.int/Treaty.htm.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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The Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT) was, on paper, still a serious expression of
collective defence. The wording of the mutual defence commitment in its Article
V was more direct and absolute than that adopted by the Allies in NATO’s
Washington Treaty, as seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Comparison of Mutual Defence Clauses, WEU and NATO
Also, Article VIII of the MBT empowered the WEU Council to consult on ‘any
situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat
should arise’. On the other hand, WEU inherited and maintained the Western
Union’s decision of 1950 not to develop any military structures and (peacetime)
activities of its own, but to leave all such matters to NATO.13 The day-to-day
tasks remaining for the new organization consisted mainly of post-war business
that was important for the full rehabilitation of Germany, but by nature time-
limited: the monitoring of specific aspects of German disarmament (through the
WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments, ACA), and the temporary custodi-
anship of the province of the Saar (Saarland) until it opted during elections in
1956 to return to Germany. While the MBT foresaw WEU also having a role in
building European non-military cooperation – its full title referred to ‘Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence’ – the
crystallizing out of Europe’s multi-institutional architecture during the 1950s
saw these other roles firmly appropriated by either the European Communities
or the Council of Europe.
Modified Brussels Treaty Art. V Washington Treaty Art. 5
‘If any of the High Contracting Parties should be
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other
High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all
the military and other aid and assistance in their
power’
The Parties agree that an armed attack against
one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an attack
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defence recognised by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by tak-
ing forthwith, individually and in concert with the
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’
13. Even regarding consultations or deliberations on defence, the MBT did not foresee independent WEU
capacities but stated that ‘recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the
Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and
advice on military matters.’DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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Nevertheless, the 1950s and early 1960s were a time to bed down WEU’s own
institutional structure and working routines. Its headquarters were initially
established at London, balancing the placing of NATO in Paris and the EC at
Brussels. The supreme decision-making body was the inter-governmental Coun-
cil, meeting nominally and occasionally at Ministerial level but routinely at the
Ambassadorial level of Permanent Representatives, very much as in NATO. It
had an annually rotating Presidency following the sequence of member states’
names in English.14 A modest international staff composed of nationals of the
full member states was headed by the Secretary-General, a post first occupied
from 1955-1962 by Louis Goffin (a full list of Secretaries-General is in Figure
2). Again as in NATO, the Secretary-General chaired the WEU Council when
meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives (‘Permanent Council’). The
ACA had its own staff, and there was also a Standing Armaments Committee,
which however saw much of its role shift to the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG) set up by NATO in 1976 and was finally closed down in
1989.15 WEU’s two working languages, English and French, had equal status
and were used in meetings16 and day-to-day business without interpretation.
Figure 2: Secretaries-General of WEU
A final important element, first created by the MBT, was a Parliamentary
Assembly to which each member nation sent a delegation from its national Par-
liament, consisting of the same MPs as were nominated to the Council of
Europe’s Assembly.17 The Council was obliged to report (at least once) annually
14. In 1994 the Presidency term was shortened to 6 months to match EU practice and in 1997 a new rota-
tion was agreed to come into force from 1999, whereby the same state would hold both the EU and WEU
Presidency whenever possible.
15. As explained below (section III.2), the armaments task then reverted to the WEU framework with the
creation of the Western European Armaments Group, WEAG.
16. At Ministerial meetings and in the Assembly, a wider range of languages was provided for. Later when
WEU/NATO joint Councils were held, interpretation had to be arranged for non-French speaking NATO
Permreps.
Louis Goffin
Maurice Iweins d’Eeckhoutte
Georges Heisbourg
Friedrich-Karl von Plehwe
Edouard Longerstaey
Alfred Cahen
Willem Frederik van Eekelen
José Cutileiro
Javier Solana
Arnaud Jacomet
1955-62
1962-70
1971-74
1974-77 (acting)
1977-85
1985-89
1989-94
1994-99
1999-2009
acting, from 25 November 2009
17. The Treaty had originally envisaged a single assembly handling both CoE and WEU business but by
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on its work to this body, which was also left with considerable freedom to decide
what it would debate and study, which guest speakers it would invite and so
forth.18 Convening for the first time in July 1955, the Assembly met at Paris but
could also opt to hold special sessions elsewhere. While it was to prove a lively
member of the WEU institutional family – and ultimately the most tenacious! –
it should be noted that its role was, as with the NATO equivalent, purely delib-
erative and advisory; it had no equivalent to the budgetary co-decision powers
that the European Parliament enjoyed from the start.
By the end of the 1950s WEU was entering what is commonly described as its
dormant period, with all its transitional tasks completed, and no obvious role
to play in the vacant ground between a NATO purely and acutely focused on
‘real’ defence and an EC still limited to civilian ambitions. If proceedings in the
WEU Council, the WEU Assembly, and their informal ‘corridors’ held any value
at all for Euro-Atlantic high politics – from this time to the mid-1980s – it was
in contexts where no clear result could be reported at the time or easily meas-
ured today. First, so long as Britain remained outside the fabric of European
integration, joining the EC as it did only in 1973, the WEU grouping was one
place where it could communicate with France, Germany and the rest of the Six
founding states.19 Secondly, after General de Gaulle chose to take France out of
NATO’s Integrated Military Structure in 1965, the WEU forum remained one
where in principle the French could still raise defence issues, even of a technical
or armaments-related nature, with the UK and other partners. Thirdly, it is inter-
esting to ponder whether the very notion of the seven-nation WEU group as a
distinctly European security forum helped to legitimize and develop the notion
of European cooperation on external diplomatic, defence, security and arms
control issues – paving the way for the EC-based Political Cooperation that was
to flourish (and grow steadily more institutionalized) above all after Britain’s
accession.
At any rate, the first clear interruption of WEU’s slumber came in the mid-
1980s, at a time when strategic conditions in the Euro-Atlantic space and the
roles of related institutions had both evolved greatly. The United States, not for
the first or last time, was preoccupied with threats from non-European regions
including attacks by international terrorists and the ‘rogue’ states that spon-
sored them. Pressure from Washington and especially from Congress for better
18. Ernst Christoph Lotter in ‘WEU’s Assembly: Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy?’
(Deighton and Remacle, The Western European Union, 1948-1998: from the Brussels Treaty to the
Treaty of Amsterdam, as note 9 above) notes how the Assembly from its first days concerned itself with
matters going beyond WEU’s own limitations, acting in effect like ‘the right body in the wrong organiza-
tion’.
19. R. McAllister, From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey, p. 42, Routledge: London, 1997.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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burden-sharing in Europe by a strengthened European ‘pillar’ within the Alli-
ance was high. Relations with the Soviet bloc meanwhile were complicated on
the one hand by the maturation of détente policies that brought arms control
and confidence building heavily on to agendas in NATO, the CSCE20 and even
in EC circles;21 and on the other by aggressive and oppressive Soviet actions
both in Europe and further afield (Afghanistan). Following patterns that have
recurred right up to the present, influential European states could find them-
selves divided in their responses to US actions and demands; in their sense of
how strictly or how cooperatively and understandingly to deal with the great
Eastern neighbour; and at another level, also by their differential loyalties to,
and conceptions of the proper role of, different security-relevant institutions.
It was against this background that in 1984, France, Belgium, Germany, and
Italy began to canvass the idea of reviving WEU as a forum for serious intra-
European policy discussion. Typically, they were driven less by regard for the
organization per se than by its convenience as a body with undisputed defence
competence that could meet without North American scrutiny, but also without
risk of the smaller and more peripheral Europeans complicating things. The UK,
under a Conservative Government that was basically but not uncritically pro-
American, decided to go along with the initiative and try to keep it on the right
track rather than protesting.22 Accordingly, WEU Foreign Ministers met in
Rome in October 1984, to adopt a declaration that sketched the lines for WEU’s
political reanimation and its institutional reform.23 Proclaiming values of peace,
deterrence and defence, and stability through dialogue and co-operation, they
agreed to make better use of the WEU framework to increase their co-operation
in the field of security policy and to promote consensus. The aim would be not
only to serve Western Europe’s own interests but to improve security and soli-
darity among all members of NATO, and care would be taken to maintain liai-
son with European NATO members not in WEU.24 The Council, meeting at
Ministerial level twice per year, would remain at the centre of WEU activity but
would also seek to improve its dialogue with the Assembly.25 Further, Ministers
of Defence from member states would be invited to join in Ministerial Council
20. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, inaugurated by the Helsinki Final Act of
1976, now called the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
21. Security issues at least of a more cooperative and ‘softer’ kind had started to be discussed in EC Polit-
ical Cooperation in the context of European inputs to CSCE, plus some global disarmament and regional
security topics.
22. British interest at this time in a stronger ‘European pillar’ was expressed i.a. in a Foreign Affairs arti-
cle under that title by Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, reported in Alyson JK Bailes, ‘NATO’S European
Pillar: The European Security and Defense Identity’, Defense Analysis, vol. 15, no. 3 (NATO 50th anni-
versary edition), 1999.
23. WEU Council of Ministers (1984), “Rome Declaration,” retrieved November 5, 2010, from http://
www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_rome.php
24. Ibid.
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meetings – a step that could be seen as especially significant,26 not just because
it made WEU the first and only purely European body where these Ministers
(and their military advisers) could foregather, but also as foreshadowing the
next historic step towards the launching of actual European military operations.
The early years of this WEU revival had a definite, if unquantifiable effect in
helping ‘core’ European governments to maintain some cohesion in their han-
dling of the thorniest trans-Atlantic issues of the time, and in scotching more
extreme positions. Publicly, it made progress notably with the adoption of a
‘Platform on European Security Interests’, commonly called the Hague Plat-
form, at the WEU Ministerial Council at The Hague in October 1987. This was
of interest both for its defence-policy and its institutional content. On the first
point, it built a bridge between France and the other NATO members on strate-
gic questions, recognizing the need for a mix of nuclear and conventional weap-
ons in the defence of Europe, the continued presence of American forces in the
continent, and the defence of member countries at their borders.27 Institution-
ally, it spoke of WEU’s own revival as an important contribution to the broader
process of European unification, and of the Modified Brussels Treaty, with its
far-reaching obligations to collective security, as an important means to this
end.28 In the most obvious hint that the old European defence ideal was not
buried beyond retrieval, it stressed EU Member States’ commitment to build a
Union in accordance with the Single European Act and their conviction that the
construction of an integrated Europe would remain incomplete as long as it did
not include security and defence.29
If the earliest gleam may be seen here of a European solution that would super-
sede WEU itself, for the moment WEU’s own structure and pattern of activities
were being rebuilt in ways tailor-made for the new environment. The revival
drew interest from other Europeans, resulting in the admission of Spain and
Portugal as full members in 1990 (Greece would become the final new full mem-
ber in 1995). A WEU Institute for Security Studies was opened at Paris in 1990,
providing an asset for which neither NATO nor the EU had any match at the
time, and in 1991 Ministers agreed to open an equally innovative WEU Satellite
Centre at Torréjon de Ardoz near Madrid.30 Further, opportunities now started
26. Wim van Eekelen, ‘The institutional reforms of WEU’ (interview, 2009), at http://www.ena.lu/
interview_willem_van_eekelen_institutional_reforms_weu_hague_october_2009-2-38502.
27. Wim van Eekelen, From words to deeds: The Continuing Debate on European Security, Centre for
European Policy Studies and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Brussels/
Geneva, 2006, p.4.
28. United Kingdom Parliament, Extracts from the WEU Ministerial Council Platform on European
Security Interests, London: 1987, retrieved November 6, 2010 from http://www.parliament.the-station-
ery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/264/26415.htm
29. Ibid.
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to arise to organize – or at least, coordinate – European-led military operations
for which WEU offered the best and, for the moment, the only ready-made
‘home’. In 1987-88 during the Iran-Iraq war, and in 1990-91 after Iraq’s inva-
sion of Kuwait, WEU coordinated the work of European vessels in mine-clear-
ing in Gulf waters to ensure the safety of shipping. Its mandate in the second
case included helping to enforce UN sanctions, and it also contributed to the
humanitarian actions for Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.31 Admittedly,
naval operations where the smallest unit of coordination is a ship are far
removed from ‘European army’-type visions of deep military integration; but for
the future, the most important thing was that these WEU-managed operations
did their job, ran into no trouble, and upset nobody.
31. Planning for WEU’s role in the Gulf also triggered the first ever meeting of Chiefs of Defence of WEU
nations, at Paris in August 1990. See Arnaud Jacomet, ‘The Role of WEU in the Gulf Crisis’ in Nicole
Gnesotto and John Roper (eds.), Western Europe and the Gulf (WEU-ISS: Paris, 1992) – the first aca-
demic publication of the WEU Institute for Security Studies, and Gordon Wilson, ‘WEU’s operational
capacity: delusion or reality’ in Guido Lenzi (ed.), weu.@.fifty, as note 9 above.19
3. WEU ‘DIGGING ITS OWN GRAVE’: 
OPERATIONALIZATION FROM 1991-1999
The end of the Cold War and of the military partition of Europe in 1989-90
ushered in a radically new strategic environment; new challenges for security
institutions; and a process of consequential change in the institutions them-
selves, which arguably has yet to run its full course. WEU was as exposed as any
to these forces of history, and it evolved in fact under a double dynamic in the
new decade. Its own relative ‘lightness’ of standing, duties, and legalized acquis
allowed it to adapt faster in some respects to the new conditions, thus offering
a laboratory where Europeans could continue – as in the 1980s – to experiment
with security governance at rather low risk and cost. At the same time and in the
end more significantly, it was pushed and pulled in new directions by develop-
ments both inside NATO and in the EU’s European construction process: ending
up, by the mid-1990s, as the first and only operative bridge between these two
heavier-hitting institutions. This section will trace WEU’s story up to the next
watershed in 1998-9 under three main, closely interlinked headings: enlarge-
ment, crisis management, and the evolving NATO-WEU-EU relationship in the
sphere of European defence. Under each topic, hindsight will show how WEU’s
achievements – as much as its limitations – were setting the scene for its own
eventual redundancy.
Table 2: Chronology of WEU Revival, Second Phase 1991-1999
December 1991 WEU Declarations on the role of WEU and its relations with EU and
NATO approved in Maastricht. WEU agrees to invite other EU mem-
ber states also belonging to NATO to join WEU.
June 1992 An operational role is conferred on WEU by the Petersberg Declara-
tion, defining relevant crisis management tasks. Forces answerable
to WEU (FAWEU) and a Planning Cell are established.
November 1992 Turkey, Norway and Iceland become WEU Associate Members. Ire-
land and Denmark become WEU Observers. 
December  1992 The work of NATO’s Independent European Programme Group
(IEPG) is transferred to the Western European Armaments Group
(WEAG) established in the WEU framework.
January 1993 Transfer of WEU Council and Secretariat-General from London to
Brussels.
January 1994 NATO gives its support for the development of the European Secu-
rity and Defence Identity and for the principle of making Alliance
assets and capabilities available for WEU operations.
May  1994 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
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3.1. A Europe whole and free
In the first euphoria of the new decade, notably while negotiating the CSCE’s
new Charter of Paris,32 it was possible to imagine the institutions of Western
Europe gradually losing their separate identity within a larger, inclusive ‘single
European home’. If this vision evaporated after a mere 2-3 years, the reasons
should be sought not only in the outbreak of armed violence in the Former
Yugoslavia, but also in the speed with which the newly free Central Europeans
concluded they had no safe choice but to join both the EU and NATO. Such
alternatives as a regional pact, neutrality, or free cooperation with Russia (con-
templated for a while e.g. by Bulgaria and Slovakia)33 could not drive the inter-
nal transformations that the new democracies needed to distance themselves
both from Communism and the spectre of the 1930s. Nor could they convinc-
ingly shield Europe’s Eastern heartland from the still menacing uncertainties cre-
ated by Russia’s own ups and downs in these early years.
Enlargement of the Western institutions was thus being seriously debated even
before NATO, in its Brussels Summit declaration of January 1994,34 officially
November 1994 WEU publishes its Preliminary Conclusions on the formulation of a
Common European Defence Policy (CEDP).
January 1995 Following their accession to the EU, Austria, Sweden and Finland
become WEU Observers.
Greece becomes WEU’s tenth full member.
May 1996 WEU-NATO Security Agreement signed.
June 1996 At NATO’s Berlin Ministerial, ESDI concepts are further defined
including the possibility of loaning a NATO Combined Joint Task
Force for a WEU-led European operation.
June  1996 The Situation Centre located at WEU’s Headquarters becomes
operational.
June 1996 Slovenia becomes a WEU Associate Partner.
November 1996 The WEAG states set up the Western European Armaments Organ-
isation, WEAO.
March 1999 Following their accession to NATO, Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary become WEU Associate Members.
32. Signed 19 November 1990, text available at http:/www.osce.org/documents.
33. Andrew Cottey, East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovakia in Search of Security, Houndsmills, Macmillan: London, 1995.
34. The declaration includes the words: ‘We have agreed…to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to
the membership of other European countries’. Text at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/
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faced up to the possibility and launched Partnership for Peace to serve the needs
of would-be applicants among others. But it was equally clear that the first new
admissions to either institution would take time, and would demand (above all
from NATO) much care and skill to handle the inevitable Russian reactions. The
EU had even less flexibility for snap decisions given the established formality
and wide coverage of its pre-accession routines. WEU was the one exclusively
Western forum where immediate experiment was possible, precisely because the
stakes were nothing like as high.
Changes in the WEU membership structure had in fact started even sooner, in
connection with the signing in 1992 of the EU’s Maastricht Treaty35 which – as
further explained below (III.3) – set a higher mark for the Union’s security and
defence ambitions and in the process demanded a closer WEU-EU relationship.
In a declaration adopted on 9-10 December 1991 when WEU Ministers also met
at Maastricht,36 WEU’s members invited EU member states who had not yet
joined WEU to do so according to procedures to be determined in the context
of the MBT, or to become Observers if they wished. The inwardness of this
bland language was that in practice, WEU would not accept new full members
who were not already in, or in the process of joining, NATO. Even had any such
state been ready to sign up to the MBT’s guarantees, there was no way to exe-
cute the latter except through NATO, and trying to dodge that fact could have
called in question the seriousness of the MBT’s meaning for everyone.37 On this
reasoning, the only additional European state qualified to accede to the MBT as
of 1992 was Denmark: but the Danes had gained an opt-out from all defence-
related aspects of European construction as part of their conditions for ratifying
Maastricht,38 and to be consistent, considered that they should settle for
Observer status in WEU. This status was also adopted in 1992 by Ireland, as a
non-allied state, and later by Austria, Finland and Sweden on their accession to
the EU in 1995. As already mentioned, Greece became the final full member to
join the WEU structure in 1995.
WEU’s role at this stage in history was all about balance, however, and in
December 1991 it also underlined its wish for intensified relations with
35. Treaty on European Union, signed at Maastricht 7 Feb. 1992 and entering into force on 1 Nov. 1993,
text at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html.
36. This with a number of other historic WEU texts is available at http://www.weu.int/Key%20texts.htm.
37. It should be stressed that this was an understanding among WEU members and staffs, rather than a
formal prescription. There was thus scope for some Austrian politicians, for instance, to speculate during
the 1990s about whether they might accede to the MBT without joining NATO, but such trial balloons
were always in the end shot down.
38. Henrik Larsen, ‘Denmark and the EU’s defence dimension: Opt-out across the board?’ in Nina
Graeger, Henrik Larsen and Hanna Ojanen, The ESDP and the Nordic countries: four variations on a
theme, Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Institut für Europäische Politik, Helsinki and Berlin:
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NATO.39 To facilitate that and to balance the new EU incomers, those NATO
Allies not in the EU – currently Iceland, Norway and Turkey – were invited to
become Associate Members of the institution. All did so, and this was a partic-
ularly novel step for Iceland: an Ally with no armed forces, which had not taken
part in Europeans-only groups within NATO due to these bodies’ focus on
armaments. The implications of Associate Member status took some time to
clarify, but eventually gave these states a stronger position than any others in the
WEU system except full members. Notably, they were allowed to contribute to
the military staffs of WEU’s Planning Cell, and to the WEU core budget; and the
fact that full and associate members were linked elsewhere by formal defence
guarantees was recognized in various unpublicized but significant ways.
Also in 1992 and not by coincidence, WEU took the first step in its own opening
to the East. In a special joint meeting at WEU’s Petersberg (Bonn) Ministerial in
June, the five non-Soviet former members of the Warsaw Pact and the three
Baltic States were invited to enter a multilateral Forum of Consultation with
WEU. Discussions there were to focus on security conditions in the CSCE area
including arms control and disarmament, and they also allowed views to be
exchanged on the worsening crisis in Former Yugoslavia. The Central Europe-
ans themselves continued, however, to press for closer access and were sup-
ported by France and Germany.40 The UK, which was generally pro-enlarge-
ment but more inclined to protect existing NATO members’ status in WEU,
came on board in the context of a package of measures adopted at the Kirchberg
(Luxembourg) Ministerial, May 1994, where Associate Member status was also
further defined.41 The nine Central European states who by now had also been
recognized as potential members of the European Union – Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia
– were offered, and accepted, a new status as Associate Partners of WEU. Fol-
lowing the logic of the link with EU applicant status, Slovenia joined them in
June 1996.
With the three new categories of Associate Member, Observer and Associate
Partner now established, WEU’s post-Cold War architecture settled into a form
that was to see no further major change up to its dissolution. Logically enough,
39. ‘WEU’s relations with the Atlantic Alliance’, second Maastricht Declaration of 10 December 1991,
text at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_maastricht_
fromeu_site.php
40. Monika Wohlfeld, ‘Closing the gap: WEU and Central European countries’ in Guido Lenzi (ed.),
weu.@.fifty, as note 9 above
41. In particular, an understanding was reached that WEU full members would not invoke their mutual
guarantees for operations directed at NATO Allies who did not have full-member status – a crucial point
for Turkey. Miguel Medina-Abellan, Turkey, the European Security and Defence Policy and Accession
Negotiations, SinAN Working Paper No. 1, Middle East University Ankara, 24 April 2009: text at http://
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when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1997 they
moved up to Associate Member status, producing the pattern of WEU’s final
years as shown in Figure Three below. Its complexity was often mocked by out-
siders but posed no great problems in daily business, as the great bulk of activity
went on either ‘at 21’ (among NATO and/or EU members) or with the full fam-
ily ‘at 28’. However, there were further intricacies that could baffle even the
cognoscenti: some specialized working groups and activities transferred from
NATO (including the Transatlantic Forum for publicity work in the USA and
Canada, for instance) were conducted by full members plus Associate Members
only or ‘at 16’. Further, when the lead in European Armaments work was trans-
ferred from NATO to the WEU framework in 1992, the resulting WEAG and
WEAO structures developed their own peculiar geometry as will be explained
further in the next sub-section.
Figure 3: Statuses in the WEU Membership Structure, as of 1999
What roles did the various non-full members of WEU play in practice? The main
matters reserved for the innermost 10 were the tenure of the revolving Presi-
dency – and thus the hosting of Ministerial meetings; personnel appointments
and staff management; budgeting;42 and also the rules of security (which had to
be stringent enough to allow WEU and NAT0 to share classified materials). At
the opposite extreme, all 28 states took part in decision-making on WEU oper-
ations and could opt in to them either with personnel and equipment or finan-
42. This refers to the WEU institutional budget, including costs of the Assembly. Operational budgets
were constructed ad hoc on a sliding GNP scale, to include all nations taking part plus any that wanted to
make purely financial contributions.
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cial contributions. They conducted what might be called the ‘foreign policy’ of
WEU which included notably relationships with Russia and Ukraine, a Mediter-
ranean dialogue and efforts to support indigenous peacekeeping in Africa; plus
general-purpose information work. Work done ‘at 21’ with the Associate Mem-
bers plus Observers revolved around relations with NATO and the EU, and
importantly, gave all the 21 equal access to these interactions. The West Euro-
pean non-full members thus had speaking and co-decision43 rights not just in
WEU’s own work, but in joint WEU-NATO and WEU-EU meetings44 – which
became more frequent and meaningful in the late 90s, as explained below. For
Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden this offered major added value on top of
their direct access to NATO through membership of Partnership for Peace,
which they shared with a motley crew of NATO applicants and non-applicants
ranging as far as Central Asia. Working in WEU also deepened the impact of
their exposure and assimilation to common European policy-making on security
in the CFSP context.45 Conversely, Iceland, Norway and Turkey were able to
open a back door into the EU’s external policy making process – gaining the
chance to influence and be influenced by its particular culture (including for
instance the inputs of the European Commission) – in a way that no form of
partnership offered by the EU itself at this stage would have allowed.46
For all these groups of states, WEU could be no more than a side-track in the
post-Cold War game of institutional change and expansion where NATO and
the EU alone held the real prizes. It could also, however, serve as a ‘school’ and
rehearsal ground that might boost national prospects if used intelligently; while
the ties and mutual understanding formed there played a not negligible part in
helping non-Balkan Europe weather the strains of the 1990s in peace.47 It was
surely no coincidence that the Associate Partners vied to contribute (also in
cash) to WEU operations and were on their best behaviour in simulation exer-
cises also involving NATO. Not only in WEU’s conference rooms but also in the
43. This term is not exact as the joint meetings had no legal personality or law-making role, but it is cor-
rect to say that consensus was sought among all participants and was, in practice, the condition for any
follow-up within WEU’s own system.
44. WEU-NATO joint meetings were held between the respective Permanent Councils. WEU-EU joint
meetings took place (pre-2000) with the Security Committee in the CFSP structure, which met monthly in
Brussels at the level of Directors of Security in member-state Foreign Ministries.
45. Paul Luif, ‘The Western European Union and the Neutrals: The security policy of Europe’s non-
aligned countries in the context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in Deighton and
Remacle (eds.), The Western European Union 1948-1998, as note 9 above.
46. The main way these three states could get involved in CFSP outside WEU was by associating them-
selves with EU declarations and positions adopted in that framework. Norway and Iceland were also in
the European Economic Area from 1994 but this involved little significant contact on foreign or security
policy in practice. After signing the Treaty of Accession and before its ‘No’ referendum in 1995 Norway
was briefly able to send officials to sit in at CFSP meetings.
47. Wim van Eekelen described this as ‘security through participation’ in his note on ‘WEU Missions and
Cooperation with NATO – Comments’ in Deighton and Remacle (eds.), The Western European Union,
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corridors, they could absorb the substance, style and national power-play of free
European multilateralism in preparation for the day when they would join it
with equal rights.48 As an empirical observation, all the groups of non-full mem-
bers tended to send young diplomats and military officers of above-average tal-
ent to their WEU delegations – not least for the practical reason that they had
to understand both English and French. By the mid-2000s, many of the same
individuals would be found holding high official, Ambassadorial, or even Min-
isterial posts (and the military equivalent) in the security apparatuses of the
nations concerned.
3.2. Crisis Management (and Capabilities)
With due caution, the end of the Cold War can be defined as a turning point in
approaches – or at least, Euro-Atlantic approaches – to military crisis manage-
ment missions on three main grounds. Perhaps most obviously, the sudden less-
ening of direct military threat for countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain
threw other security challenges, and other potential roles for armed forces and
security organizations, into proportionately higher prominence and released
more resources and energy for tackling them, even after ‘peace dividends’ were
taken.49 Secondly, regime changes associated with the collapse of Soviet and
European Communism – plus the lifting of bipolar discipline from former proxy
states elsewhere – opened the way for new conflicts to break out or for tempo-
rarily frozen ones to recur, including in places like the Western Balkans, the
Caucasus, and Central Asia where European powers/institutions could hardly
ignore them. Thirdly, the main strategic restraint on direct intervention by
NATO or former Warsaw Pact powers was lifted because escalation between
East and West was no longer an issue, while positive pressure for intervention
built up in several political quarters. Traditionalists could see the USA becoming
‘the world’s policeman’ as an extension of its long-term power projection and a
celebration of its new ‘single superpower’ status, while the Left saw new scope
for liberal or ‘humanitarian’ intervention in a world no longer ruled by zero-sum
superpower rivalry.
Of course, it did not take long before the most sanguine Western expectations
48. Eric Remacle in 1998 detected ‘une convergence stratégique informelle progressive non-institutional-
isée ou faiblement institutionalisée’ for which he gave special credit to the roles played by smaller states
(‘Le Rôle de Petits États au sein de l’UEO’ in Deighton and Remacle (eds.), The Western European Union,
1948-1998, as note 9 above).
49. This expression refers to troop cuts and savings in military expenditure made all over Europe in the
early 1990s: for an introduction to their scale and consequences see Alyson JK Bailes, Oleksiy Melnik and
Ian Anthony, Relics of of Cold War: Europe’s Challenge, Ukraine’s Experience, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 6
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were dashed by bitter US experiences in Somalia;50 but the demand for interven-
tion remained strong enough to ensure that lead nations and organizations
would toughen their approaches rather than just give up. The Gulf War of 1990-
91 following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a turning-point in many ways: pop-
ularizing the notion of ‘peace-making’ or ‘peace enforcement’ which could
involve the ‘good guys’ using methods hardly less forceful than self-defence in a
high-intensity environment; showing that the UN could delegate tasks to an ad
hoc coalition to couple legitimacy with fire-power; and teaching first lessons on
the new forms of military organization and command structure required, the
new challenges for civil-military and official/NGO interaction, and the impor-
tance of public opinion management in such contingencies. Given the prominent
roles played by the US and some European states in the Gulf operation, this set
of issues and lessons – together with headaches over finding the necessary force
assets and the cost in ‘good guy’ casualties – was to shape subsequent debates
and decisions on conflict intervention in all the Euro-Atlantic institutions, as
well as in UN circles, throughout the next decade. The findings were soon to be
tested by a major challenge in Europe itself with the armed hostilities that broke
out in the Former Yugoslavia (FRY) from mid-1991 onwards.
WEU had, as noted,51 already profiled itself as the only purely European organ-
ization taking ownership of military operations with its coordination of naval
actions to protect shipping in the Iran-Iraq war, and again in the Gulf War itself.
It thus offered a natural forum for Europeans to reflect on their collective posi-
tion; and by the time Ministers met at the Petersberg conference centre over-
looking the Rhine at Bonn on 19 June 1992, they were under pressure to do so
from the NATO side, from the EU side, and from live events – as that same
month saw the first fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As explained further in the
next subsection, NATO since its London declaration of July 199052 had
embraced the notion of a ‘European identity in the domain of security’, while
the EU’s Maastricht Treaty for the first time aspired to ‘a common defence pol-
icy, which might in time lead to a common defence’53 and envisaged asking
WEU to carry out any necessary military actions in the meantime. WEU for its
part had accepted the implied roles in its own Maastricht declarations already
cited. The question was what form such European-led operations, carried out
from a NATO base, autonomously, or conceivably under a UN or OSCE man-
date, might take: and WEU Ministers adopted an answer to it that was to colour
50. The US sent peacekeeping troops to Somalia in 1992 but withdrew in 1994 following losses of life in
violent incidents: for details see the US Army historical publication The United States Army in Somalia,
available at http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm.
51. See the end of section II above.
52. Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, adopted at the London NATO Summit 5-6
July 1990.
53. Language from article J4.1, which was preserved in the subsequent Treaty revisions.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
27
the whole subsequent history of European defence. In a separate section II of
their communiqué on developing WEU’s operational role, they stated that WEU
forces under the organization’s own command could be used for:
‘– humanitarian and rescue tasks;
– peacekeeping tasks;
– tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.54
This soon-to-be-classic ‘Petersberg tasks’ formulation was a creature of its day
both in its elements of relative precision (the implied gradation in intensity
between humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks), and in one open-
ended phrase that signalled still-evolving Western thinking (‘tasks of combat
forces in crisis management’). Its political acceptability at the time, and subse-
quent ease of incorporation into EU doctrine, rested on the fact that it limited
European ambitions more explicitly than ever before to altruistic operations ‘of
choice’ rather than of self-defence: so it is ironic to note that it appeared in a
paragraph that began with a reference to WEU forces ‘contributing to the com-
mon defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article
V of the modified Brussels Treaty’. However, as always since 1954, WEU mem-
bers forestalled any misapprehensions by including language explicitly deferring
to NATO, and making clear that the organization’s work would not include any
practical planning for ‘hard’ defence. The Petersberg Declaration invited nations
to offer contributions to a catalogue of ‘forces available to WEU’ – FAWEU, or
FRUEO in French – and did not put any restrictions on the kinds of units that
could be offered.55 But the new military Planning Cell that the Ministers also
agreed to establish, and which would start operation in October the same year,
was in practice to concentrate its planning, procedures, development of doc-
trines, and exercise schedule purely on crisis management missions of the
‘Petersberg’ types.
These steps in the ‘operationalization’ of WEU, coupled with the move of the
organization’s HQ from London to Brussels in 1993 which put it in direct con-
tact with both the EU and NATO, opened a new phase in WEU activities just as
the Petersberg decisions on participation launched the WEU equivalent of
enlargement.56 Any hopes that WEU would become the power-house of post-
54. Full text of the declaration is at www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.
55. Some full members in fact listed as FAWEU all the same forces that they committed to NATO (see also
section VI below). The Petersberg text particularly encouraged the committing of relevant headquarters
and of ‘Euroforces’ such as the Eurocorps established in 1993 on the basis of the previous Franco-German
Brigade. Several other such forces bringing together 2-6 European states were made available both to
NATO and WEU during the 1990s.
56. For an interim verdict on the operationalization process see Trevor Taylor, ‘Challenges for Western
European Union Operations’ and Bart Rosengren, ‘The role of the Western European Union Planning
Cell’ in Anne Deighton (ed.), Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration, as note
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Cold War European interventionism were, however, to prove short-lived. When
the UN mission UNPROFOR proved inadequate in 1994 to control the spiral-
ling inter-ethnic violence in Former Yugoslavia, the need for combat-hardened
forces, escalation dominance, and perhaps also deterrence of Russian mischief-
making ensured that NATO itself was the only feasible choice as a replacement.
When France led Opération Turquoise to help curb the Rwandan genocide in
1994 and was – at least at one stage – looking for additional European buy-in,
no serious thought was given to making the mission a WEU one; and WEU was
again left as a bystander when Italy with 10 other European nations deployed
the Multinational Protection Force known as Operation Alba to help control
disorder on Albania in March 1997.57 The operations that WEU did carry out
were limited to a repeat of its former naval coordination role, in relation to the
enforcement of UN sanctions in the Adriatic from 1993-6, and a number of non-
military missions as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Chronology of WEU Operations, 1990-1999
The story of WEU’s various missions to the Western Balkans will not be told in
further detail here, as good factual and analytical sources are available58 and the
57. Op Alba was the first modern European-only military operation of significant size, with some 6500
soldiers from 11 European countries. On WEU’s non-involvement see Sophia Clément, ‘WEU and South-
Eastern Europe’ in Guido Lenzi (ed.), weu.@.fifty, as note 8 above; and for an in-house French view of the
various national and institutional politics behind the decision, Jean-Philippe Roux, L’Europe de la
Défense. Il était une fois..., L’Harmattan: Paris, 2005, p.169 et seq. For operational details see Riccardo
Marchio, “Operation Alba”, A European Approach to Peace Support in the Balkans, US Army War Col-
lege 2000, text at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378201.
1990-1991 WEU coordinated the clearance of sea mines and embargo monitoring
operations during the Gulf War.
1993-1996 WEU/NATO joint operation in the Adriatic Sea in support of the UN
embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.
1993-1996 WEU provided assistance to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in enforcing
UN sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro on the Danube river.
1994-1996 WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU administration of the city
of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1997-2000 WEU sent an advisory police element (MAPE) to Albania to provide advice
and train instructors.
1998 WEU Satellite Centre embarked on a mission of general security surveillance
of Kosovo.
1999 WEU implemented an EU specific action providing assistance for mine
clearance in Croatia.
58. See for instance Eric Remacle and André Dumoulin, L’Union de l’Europe Occidentale: Phénix de la
défense européenne, as note 9 above, and Sophia Clément, op.cit. in note 57 above, as well as WEU’s own
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lessons learned – with relevance to future ESDP/CSDP developments – are a
matter for section VI below. A few remarks may however be added about what
this operational profile reveals about WEU weaknesses and (if any) WEU
strengths. First, if WEU was never selected to run a military operation using
ground forces, this was not for purely technical or legal reasons but rather a
matter of political image, confidence, and cost-benefit calculations. The organ-
ization was simply not well enough known or highly enough rated even among
political elites, let alone the military, in European capitals. For the larger Euro-
pean military nations who led operations like Turquoise and Alba, the small and
untried WEU staffs looked unlikely to provide much added value compared to
the national intelligence, headquarters, and other assets they could control
directly; while running an operation through a community of 28 nations threat-
ened to hamper their freedom for no obvious compensating benefit. Of course,
the more often that WEU was passed over as a result, the more the assumption
of its inadequacy became ingrained.
On the other side, the pattern of WEU’s actual operations shows signs of a flex-
ibility and a modest innovative capacity that were to find fruitful continuation
in the first decade of ESDP under EU management. The Mostar and Albanian
police operations were the first of their kind to be attempted under purely Euro-
pean leadership, as distinct from similar deployments by the UN and OSCE, and
they filled a functional slot that would not have been appropriate for NATO. In
Mostar the European police took on direct executive duties in a way that was
still relatively uncommon in international practice, as well as problematic.59
MAPE, for its part, was the first European mission for which an Operation
Commander as well as a Force Commander was appointed (in May 1997),
establishing a parallelism between police and military command structures that
would be particularly helpful when future missions involved both kinds of con-
tingents. Flexibility was further shown in the fact that neither of WEU’s last two
missions – remote imaging in Kosovo by the Satellite Centre and a de-mining
training mission in Croatia – was of a kind mentioned explicitly in the Peters-
berg tasks.60 The SatCen contribution was particularly innovative and offered
real help to NATO forces operating in unfamiliar terrain amid fast-changing
population movements. Finally, it is noteworthy how many of WEU’s missions
involved partnership with the EU, from Mostar, through MAPE which towards
the end received some funding from the EU’s PHARE programme in Albania,61
59. Renata Dwan, Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations, Oxford University Press:
Oxford, 2003.
60. In the event, the mention of disarmament missions would not be added to the Petersberg formula until
the Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 2009.
61. This was to fund equipment and facilities used in training Albanian police, rather than to meet
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to the SatCen and Croatian missions which were carried out under the EU’s
political authority using procedures introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (see
below). If WEU in this way helped smooth the path for the EU’s direct entry into
crisis management, it could also be seen as contributing more generally to a
growing European and global appreciation of the need for multi-functional – or
as NATO now calls it, ‘comprehensive’62 – approaches both to acute crisis man-
agement and post-conflict peace-building.
Capabilities for European Operations
Just as NATO looked to WEU in the 1990s to define the putative scope of Euro-
pean non-Article 5 operations, responsibility for framing defence-industrial col-
laboration policies to foster the necessary capabilities was passed from the Alli-
ance to the WEU framework in 1993, when NATO’s Independent European
Programme Group (IEPG) closed down and the Western European Armaments
Group – WEAG – was created.63 WEAG had a separate membership structure
from WEU (and a correspondingly distinct budget and secretariat) because the
condition of this transfer was that the non-EU European Allies should have
equal membership terms if they so wished – and Norway and Turkey did, bring-
ing the initial sum of WEAG full members to 13 including Denmark. In 2000 it
was decided that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland who had joined
NATO in 1997, but also Austria, Sweden and Finland should become full
WEAG members. The remaining Central European nations were ‘Partners’ of
WEAG. The same membership system applied to the Western European Arma-
ments Organization, WEAO, which was set up in 1996 to focus more particu-
larly on capabilities-related research projects.
In terms of substance, European armaments cooperation was and remains a
peculiarly difficult field, bedevilled by ideological and practical differences
between states on the balance to be struck between free play of markets and
government guidance and funding, and by a similarly ambivalent view of US-
European collaboration.64 Broadly speaking the UK has been found on the pro-
market side and its firms have prioritized the US link highly, while France has
62. The comprehensive approach to combining military and other inputs to peace missions grew out of
NATO’s experience in Afghanistan and figures notably in the new NATO Strategic Concept (see section V
and note 140 below).
63. Basic information on WEAG is available at the cached website http://www.weu.int/weag/index.html.
64. For a good survey which includes NATO’s earlier efforts see Jocelyn Mawdsley, The Gap between
Rhetoric and Reality: Weapons Acquisition and ESDP, Bonn International Institute for Conversion
(BICC) Paper no 26 of 2002, text at http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/paper26/
paper267.pdf. On WEUís entry into the field: Alessandro Politi, ëWestern European Union and Europeís
Defence Industryí in Anne Deighton (ed.), Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Inte-
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led the case for a policy-driven ‘European preference’, and smaller Europeans
have aimed more simply to get a lucrative share in projects. At the same time,
the defence industry as a whole has had to grapple with the post-Cold War fall
in demand, bringing pressures for corporate ‘concentration’ on the one hand
and more competitive effort to secure non-European sales on the other. In the
1990s this tipped the scales, even in UK thinking, towards more conscious pol-
icy concertation among major European producers: and a new rationale was
provided by the notion of European-led operations, allowing projects to be
selected i.a. for their relevance to state-of-the-art crisis management capabilities.
Such considerations prompted the creation in 1996 of OCCAR, the French
acronym for a four-nation Joint Armaments Cooperation Organization made
up of France, Germany, Italy and the UK,65 and of the six-power ‘Letter of
Intent’ (LOI) group in 1998 which also included Spain and Sweden.66
WEAG had both the strengths and weaknesses of a larger group combining the
OCCAR and LOI nations with less significant producers, who nevertheless had
a stake in the broader European defence enterprise and also played a role as
customers. It provided a twice-yearly discussion forum for national armaments
directors (NADs), plus annual Defence Minister meetings (back-to-back with
WEU Ministerials), and ongoing work by three ‘panels’ dealing respectively
with: cooperative equipment programmes, research and technology coopera-
tion, and procedures and economic matters. From the start WEAG members
were preoccupied with the relationship between the smaller and larger arma-
ments fora, and in 1993 they mandated a study on a European Armaments
Agency (EEA) which might somehow integrate the different levels and
approaches. WEAG never quite got as far as implementing such a grand design,
which instead became one of the inputs to conceiving the EU’s European
Defence Agency (section V below). As an interim response to the EEA study’s
findings, however, WEAG nations did establish the WEAO as a body with legal
personality that could launch multi-national research projects on a contractual,
co-funded basis. By 2004 the WEAO Research Cell had 138 active projects to
its credit, 65 of them based on new contracts with a total value of €303 million
of which 40% was financed by industry. If this constituted a success story in its
own terms, it is also important to recall that the larger question of the adequacy
– and interoperability – of European capabilities for Petersberg-type missions
remained substantially unsolved at the end of the 1990s, and was indeed one of
the main motives for seeking a solution beyond WEU (section IV below).
65. See http://www.occar-ea.org1998
66. The LOI led to a framework agreement in 2000 with aims ranging from the joint formulation of mili-
tary requirements to guaranteeing security of supply. See background information provided to the UK
Parliament at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmdfence/694/
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3.3. The Dance of the Institutions
The story of EU and NATO institutional developments in the 1990s, their reper-
cussions for WEU, and the eventual crystallization of WEU’s role as ‘middle-
man’ between the two others can be made very complicated, or rather simple.
The simpler way to visualize it is to see both of the more powerful institutions
being driven through this decade by the same demands that WEU faced – for
enlargement, and for crisis management operations – plus their own evolution-
ary dynamics. In enlargement, NATO and the EU moved roughly in parallel but
followed their own different logics, which made disparities in the pattern not
only inevitable but rational. EU adhesion required so much more varied, far-
reaching and intrusive changes in domestic governance that it was understand-
able why the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland should have surmounted the
entry hurdle seven years later again than in NATO, and Bulgaria and Romania
two years later. Closer inter-institutional coordination was arguably not even
desirable, and a further advantage of WEU’s role as an inclusive and permissive
‘finishing school’ may have been to ease the dividing lines created by such non-
synchronous moves.
The adaptation of agendas, mechanisms and actions to the demands of crisis
management was a different story. First, it was carrying NATO and the EU into
a field where their ambitions might eventually converge and even overlap; and
second, it was linked with larger and more sensitive issues of institutional evo-
lution than could ever have arisen in the relatively weak and reactive WEU. The
possibility of convergence and overlap came precisely from the fact that crisis
management operations were ‘missions of choice’, not actions in self-defence,
and that the element of military action in them was a means to a larger end
rather than free-standing and conclusive. There was no logical necessity for
every NATO member to contribute (at least, in more than symbolic terms) to
every such action under the NATO flag: thus the possibility of separate, Euro-
pean-led operations being launched from within the Alliance suddenly became
a living issue, with quite different overtones from the old notion of a ‘European
pillar’ within collective defence. Peace missions involved conventional forces, of
which the Europeans on the face of it had many, and did not require the cover
of nuclear deterrence or even escalation dominance except in a few of the tough-
est cases. Politically, provided there was no disagreement on the basic rightness
of the mission, it was no more shocking for Europeans to take part without US
troops than when they did the equivalent in UN-led operations. On the other
side, the steady growth of understanding about the complexity of peace-
keeping, -restoring and -building tasks brought the importance of non-military
contributions into stronger focus, creating niches not just for the EU but also forDEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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the CSCE/OSCE to experiment with political, mediating, humanitarian, polic-
ing, monitoring, and other more specialized crisis management roles.
If these trends saw NATO and the EU both moving into a potentially common
operational space that had not existed in any comparable form during the Cold
War, it was the inward significance of this agenda for each of them that made
the issue such a sensitive one. For NATO, the request to intervene in Former
Yugoslavia in 1994 and the success of the resulting IFOR operation (later
SFOR) came as a boon: answering the question about the post-Cold War rele-
vance of a Western military organization in terms that were all the more con-
vincing because the integrated Europe’s own frontiers were on fire. The fact that
US President Clinton had won support for this intervention, and then put such
effort into the Dayton peace negotiations, against a by no means easy domestic
background seemed to prove that US-European strategic togetherness could sur-
vive even under such an altered agenda.
From the EU side, however, Europe’s failure to halt the Yugoslavian crisis earlier
by its own efforts – and the diverging national aims that were partly to blame
for this – was a setback rich in lessons that drove efforts, throughout the decade,
not only to make the Union’s external diplomacy more united and effective but
also to give it a better tool-box. The drivers for successive efforts to strengthen
what would soon be called the Common Foreign and Security Policy included
not only practical concern for the Balkan danger, or a sense of competition with
NATO, but the raising of levels of ambition in other parts of the EU agenda that
involved aspects of security or the further centralizing of national powers or
both.67 Just as NATO realized it could not stand still and stay the same after
losing its supreme enemy, those concerned for the EU’s future saw its credibility
depending on continuous progress in the widening and deepening of its formal
competence and operational range. Towards the end of the decade, Javier Solana
would be bold enough to suggest that such strategic maturation was also needed
to meet the demands of enlargement, given that this would extend the Union’s
territorial remit to another half of Europe where states were less self-sufficient
and threats relatively more serious.68
It is, of course, over-simplifying the story to speak of each institution as a coher-
ent whole. On the one hand, there were nations who preferred not to use either
67. The obvious examples are the build-up to the introduction of a common currency, and the gradual
bringing of internal security and border management matters into the formal treaty structure.
68. An argument to this effect, noting i.a. that Europe’s relations with its next neighbours would take on
a more strategic character, will be found in Solana’s speech to the Institut für Europåische Politik at Berlin
on 17 December 1999, text at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/dis-
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NATO or the EU for the operations they considered most important, resorting
instead to some combination of UN authorization and a coalition approach.
This was the case for the Gulf war of 1990-91 against Iraq, as well as for the
European-led Turquoise and Alba interventions as already mentioned. On the
other hand, those who did want to strengthen Europe’s institutions through the
crisis management enterprise were just as divided as before in their organiza-
tional loyalties and preferences. It is no surprise to find the UK, Netherlands,
Portugal and the Nordic Allies working hard to defend NATO’s primacy and to
keep the development of any European-led operational alternative confined
within a NATO, or at least a NATO-ized and inter-governmental (=WEU)
framework. At crucial moments they generally won Italy’s help and some sym-
pathy from Spain. On the other side, France and Germany repeatedly joined
forces to push for advances in EU policy responsibility, action capacity and inde-
pendence from NATO, with support from Belgium and Luxembourg. Aside
from all other EU-related motives as listed above, such countries could see
defence competence more clearly than ever as part of the ‘finalité’ or ultimate
mission of the Union as a quasi-governmental regional polity.69 If Europeans
could give up their national currencies for the Euro, even defence as the last
bastion of national sovereignty should not be out of reach. Such hopes and com-
parisons carried a definite echo of the 1950s, with the difference that no-one any
longer spoke of using the ‘Community method’ in defence – or indeed needed
to, as the Union was busy inventing new non-Community-centric modes of
advance, most obviously in EMU itself.70
In a further re-play of the 1950s, these developments threw WEU’s role into
relief as a buffer against EU encroachment into ‘hard’ defence – for the Brits and
their allies; or for the more ambitious EU camp, as a tool that could increasingly
be subordinated to the Union’s political will. For both schools of thought, WEU
could have secondary value as a connecting link between two larger institutions
that were still not ready, or allowed by their members, to interact directly. Here
the story of concrete institutional developments will be told succinctly against
this background, and from a WEU’s-eye view.71
To begin with NATO: as noted, the Alliance was pondering already in 1990 how
to equip itself with more flexible, mobile force packages that could be used for
69. Maintaining Franco-German harmony and joint leadership was also an important consideration: see
Yves Boyer, ‘WEU: A French Perspective’ in Anne Deighton (ed.), Western European Union 1954-1997:
Defence, Security, Integration, as note 9 above, esp. pp. 65-7.
70. Vide the roles of the European Central Bank, of the Eurozone Ministers, and of the Econ/Fin Council
of the full Union in managing the new policy – in addition to and distinct from any continuing powers of
the Commission, which was similarly sidelined in CFSP.
71. The remainder of this section draws largely on Alyson JK Bailes, ‘The European Security and Defence
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the new style of ‘non-Article 5’ (= non-self-defence) missions, either on behalf of
the whole Alliance, or under European command as an expression of the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The notion of such ‘separable but
not separate’ force elements was endorsed in the new Strategic Concept adopted
at Rome in November 1991,72 which triggered important changes in force and
command structures in Europe. An Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction
Force (ARRC) was set up under a British Commander, and the European deputy
to the US Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) was gradually
groomed to be the commander of choice for a NATO-approved European oper-
ation. As the Cold War headquarters structure in Europe was trimmed back,
70% of the posts in it as well as important military positions at NATO’s political
centre (at Evere, in Brussels) were reserved for Europeans. The important Brus-
sels Summit of January 1994, a turning-point in NATO’s enlargement policy,
also introduced the concept of ‘Combined Joint Task Forces’ (CJTFs) as force
packages specially tailored for new-style missions although theoretically also
available for main defence.73
By the time of the Berlin Ministerial meeting held on 3 June 1996, two years into
NATO’s Former Yugoslav operation, Britain, Germany, and France – which had
just decided to re-join NATO’s Military Committee – were unprecedentedly seri-
ous and united about developing a working model for European-led interven-
tion. Whatever they may have thought about WEU as such, NATO-WEU inter-
action was the only route available at the time for exploring such a concept. The
Berlin declaration therefore not only set out the goals of ESDI more clearly than
ever before,74 but laid down a full and specific programme of joint work for
NATO and its ‘little brother’ organization. Aside from further development of
CJTFs and ‘separable’ command/ HQ arrangements, WEU-NATO exercises
were to be planned in a series called CMX/CRISEX; procedures were to be
worked out for consultation on launching a NATO-supported WEU operation
and for borrowing NATO assets for its execution; and NATO was to extend its
advice on national force planning to non-NATO EU members within the frame-
work of their participation in Partnership for Peace.75 Thanks to intensive work
by WEU ‘at 21’ in 1997-8, the necessary inter-institutional agreements were
concluded on all these matters and the general modalities of communication
with NATO were improved, i.a. by a study on reconciling the respective termi-
72. Text at http:www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
73. For the Summit declaration see note 34 above.
74. The ESDI was seen as improving European burden-sharing within the Alliance and strengthening
Atlantic partnership – a continuation of the earlier ‘European pillar’ idea – as well as allowing separate
European action ‘as required’. Full text of the Ministerial declaration at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-
063e.htm.
75. The modalities for this last were agreed in May 1998 and the procedures were tested successfully in
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nologies. A NATO-WEU Security Agreement was signed in 1996. Joint WEU-
NATO Council meetings, exchanges of visits and mutual observation of activi-
ties became commonplace, and it was especially significant for the future that
WEU military representatives were allowed to observe NATO planning work
for the 1998-9 Kosovo operation.
Such a degree of ‘NATO-ization’ of Europe’s only independent defence forum
was not equally welcome to all Europeans,76 and might not indeed have been
politically acceptable had not WEU-EU ties grown just as close or closer mean-
while. The EU for its part was steadily raising the bar for its external policy
ambitions, and making the security component in them more explicit, from the
time of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty onwards. Coming into force in November
1993, this text created the expression ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’
and placed such work more clearly than before in a separate, inter-governmental
‘second pillar’ of EU governance77 where parliamentary powers would be lim-
ited, the writ of the European Court of Justice would not run and most costs
would be borne by participating nations themselves. However, the Treaty also
defined ‘Joint Actions’ and ‘Common Positions’ that could be adopted on CFSP
issues and to which common budgetary allocations could be applied. Should any
such EU decision require an element of military implementation, Maastricht
provided for the EU to request the necessary action by WEU.78
The vision of an inter-governmental CFSP elaborated at Maastricht was to
prove decisive in creating a ‘safe’ institutional home where the EU’s own mili-
tary competence could later be implanted. For the moment, however, no occa-
sion arose to apply the Maastricht formula of ‘requesting’ WEU implementa-
tion, and the decisive shift in EU-WEU relations was to await the Treaty of
Amsterdam signed in October 1997. In the negotiations on this text, France,
Germany and others had pushed harder than ever for the EU to concern itself
directly with defence; but opposition from the UK, Denmark, and the recently
joined non-NATO states (Austria, Finland, Sweden) watered down both the
general preambular language on this and the practical arrangements envis-
aged.79 In a move that would also set the scene for the eventual ESDP, Finland
and Sweden proposed to lift the WEU’s Petersberg definition of potential Euro-
pean-led crisis management tasks into the EU Treaty, and to allow the EU to
‘avail itself’ of WEU (without asking!) to carry them out. In a given crisis,
76. Concern about this was felt strongly by some continental analysts and will be found illustrated, for
example, in the cited works by André Dumoulin.
77. The first pillar referring to core Community competences under the Treaties and the third, to justice
and home affairs.
78. For the Treaty text see note 36 above.
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‘guidelines’ issued by the European Council could govern both the way WEU
contributed, and the application of the EU’s own range of tools.80
When it was clear that this compromise approach would carry the day, WEU on
22 July 1997 adopted a declaration of its own81 which was affixed to the Final
Act of the Amsterdam Treaty. This document repeated and endorsed the rele-
vant Treaty language, and set out a programme for improving WEU-EU rela-
tions so as to clear the way for possible ‘availing’ contingencies. In its second
part, however, it rehearsed the new elements of WEU-NATO cooperation
already mentioned: thus graphically illustrating WEU’s balancing act and mid-
dle-man position – in these its final years of operation – between the two greater
organizations.
Among the WEU-EU improvements implemented in the next two years were
joint meetings between the WEU Council and EU Security Committee (at that
time, the top committee in the CFSP structure below COREPER); enhanced
relations between the WEU Secretariat and the EU Council Secretariat and
European Commission respectively; enhanced information exchange with clari-
fication of the necessary security procedures; and plans to bring the WEU and
EU presidencies more closely in line – although this last took effect only when
WEU was close to being dismantled. Most significant were the moves made to
flex the EU’s muscles as the mandator and political leader of Petersberg opera-
tions. As already mentioned in section III.2 above, the EU – even before Amster-
dam was in force – applied Maastricht procedures to take over political, and
some budgetary, responsibility for the MAPE police operation in Albania, and
directly mandated WEU’s last two operations for the use of Satellite Centre serv-
ices in Kosovo and de-mining training in Croatia, respectively. In addition, a
seminar and talk-through exercise were held with the EU Security Committee
which among other things showed some of the complications which could arise,
were WEU to need NATO assets for an EU-owned operation. The largely ami-
cable spirit in which all these joint activities took place – also with NATO – was
perhaps due more than anything else to WEU’s participatory structure (section
III.1 above), which kept all proceedings open and above board for the full range
of both NATO-member and EU-member Europeans.
80. The Treaty of Amsterdam came into force in 1999; text at www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/
amst-en.pdf.
81. Text at www.weu.int/documents/970722en.pdf.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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3.4. End of a Cycle: the 1998 Anniversary
When the first Brussels Treaty was signed in 1948, Article X in the text stated
that after fifty years any or all of the parties would be free to denounce it,82 with
the implication that if no-one did so it would continue indefinitely. In 1998
when this fateful anniversary came around, WEU full members were well aware
of its meaning: but no move was made from any quarter to tamper with the
Treaty. On the contrary, at the immediately preceding Erfurt Ministerial meeting
(December 1997), a communiqué stated that ‘Although political circumstances
have dramatically changed since the signature of the modified Treaty, Ministers
agreed that it continues to form a valuable part of the European security archi-
tecture’.83 The way was open to turn the year instead into a modest anniversary
celebration.
Characteristically and perhaps prudently, WEU chose to mark the occasion
mainly with publications and seminars designed for the cognoscenti, rather than
trying to appeal to a larger public. Two main events were held in Brussels: an
official seminar on crisis management with eminent political and military speak-
ers, and a larger event with a more academic, partly historical and institutional
focus. The proceedings of the latter were afterwards published as a special edi-
tion of Studia Diplomatica, the journal of the Belgian Royal Institute of Inter-
national Relations,84 while WEU itself produced a special presentation volume
distinguished by rich and, in part, previously unpublished photographic mate-
rial.85 The WEU Institute of Security Studies held its own seminar and published
another volume of contributions.86
82. ‘After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right
to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year’s notice of denuncia-
tion to the Belgian Government.’
83. Quoted in Ramses A. Wessel, ‘The Legality of the New Functions of the Western European Union’ in
in Deighton and Remacle (eds.), The Western European Union, 1948-1998, as note 9 above.
84. Now Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations. Anne Deighton and Eric Remacle (eds.).
The Western European Union, 1948-1998: from the Brussels Treaty to the Treaty of Amsterdam, as in
note 9 above.
85. WEU Secretariat-General, Western European Union: A European Journey, as note 9 above.
86. Guido Lenzi (ed.), weu.@.fifty, as note 9 above.39
4. THE EU TAKEOVER: ORIGINS AND PROCESS
4.1. From St Malo to the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP)
It would be temptingly neat to say that ‘Just when WEU thought it was safe’ for
a while, the bombshell of the Anglo-French bilateral Summit declaration at St
Malo on 4 December 199887 blew all previous calculations out of the water.
With its stark statement that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’, it signalled
a breakthrough that only an unprecedented degree of compromise between Lon-
don and Paris could have allowed. If the UK was abandoning its opposition to
a direct military role for the EU and was accepting the creation of structures
within the Union to that end (‘without unnecessary duplication’), France was
accepting that the initiative would be pursued ‘in conformity with our respective
obligations to NATO’ and in a way that would also enhance the Alliance’s own
vitality.88 Here at last was a new reading of the ‘European defence’ oxymoron
that would neither take the primary defence role away from NATO, nor make
the handling of defence too ‘European’ – the St Malo text emphasized that the
new EU powers must be developed in the CFSP framework and ‘on an intergov-
ernmental basis’.
Pivotal as it was, however, the St Malo declaration did not come out of the blue.
It was the culmination of several months of increasingly iconoclastic debate
about how to tackle ‘Amsterdam’s Unfinished Business’89 in defence and secu-
rity, reaching the level of EU Heads of State and Government in their informal
meeting at Pörtschach, Austria, on 24-25 October and continuing with a pio-
neering – though informal – meeting of EU Defence Ministers at Vienna on 4
November. The proximate cause was the Kosovo crisis of 1998-9, which
brought to a head the frustrations felt throughout Europe ever since the early
87. Text at http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html.
88. This French position was not without antecedents, as France had been strongly engaged in and influ-
enced by the development of NATO’s crisis management role in FRY, and equally active with the UK and
Germany in framing the ESDI concept reflected in NATO’s 1996 Berlin communiqué. President Chirac
had indeed attempted to negotiate terms for France’s return to NATO’s integrated military structure, but
the idea broke down (temporarily, as it turned out) by 1997 because of disagreements over high command
posts.
89. This is the title of Richard G Whitman’s Occasional Paper of January 1999 for the WEU-ISS, text at
http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/select_category/22/article/amsterdams-unfinished-busi-
ness-the-blair-governments-initiative-and-the-future-of-the-western-e/?tx_ttnews[pS]=915145200&tx_
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1990s about the Europeans’ failure to get a decisive grip even on their most
nearby and intimate security challenges. The strengthening of CFSP foreseen by
Amsterdam was already looking inadequate with that Treaty barely entered into
force, above all because of the EU’s lack of its own military instrument and of
the military expertise and competence that ought to go with it. WEU itself pro-
vided new grounds for frustration, insofar as it could hardly play more than the
role of a bystander over Kosovo:90 leaving NATO to make all the running and
thus pushing the USA – again! – into the role of arbiter over Europe’s own secu-
rity business.
In retrospect it may be forgotten how long it took for these feelings to coalesce
into a specific programme of institutional reform. Indeed, the revolutionary
aspect of the situation was perhaps precisely the fact that the largest actors were
thinking in terms of the practical and psychological changes they wanted to
produce, and only secondly about institutional logic. For Britain, improving
European intervention capabilities, and mobilizing and better using existing
ones, was now such an overriding priority that institutional options could be re-
visited purely in the light of ‘what worked’. France shared the same frustrations
notably about German performance, but was also interested in exploring how
the political and psychological pressure of EU commitments might be applied to
galvanize change – just as they had done among the economically weaker breth-
ren in the context of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). To complete the
circle, Britain’s awareness of being an EMU outsider gave it a prima facie inter-
est in finding some other grand scheme within the EU framework where it could
play a larger and ideally, a leading role.91 And finally – without exaggerating the
importance of individuals in history – the personalities of Tony Blair and
Jacques Chirac respectively, both self-confident (not to say headstrong) leaders
with sometimes iconoclastic leanings, certainly helped to brush aside precedent
and open up new space for experiment.92
Against this background, various ideas were tossed around at Pörtschach and
the subsequent defence ministers’ meeting, ranging from incorporating the WEU
structure wholesale into the EU as a ‘fourth pillar’ (with its own rules)93 to
splitting WEU somehow between the EU and NATO or even re-launching the
90. In Spring of 2000, however, when NATO bombing triggered a huge refugee outflow from Kosovo
into FYROM and Albania, MAPE supported the Albanian authorities rather effectively in handling the
situation.
91. Anne Deighton, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.
40 No. 4, 2002, available at http://www.concordantia.com/sfm2007/files/Literature/Foreign%20Policy/
deighton%20-%20esdp.pdf.
92. Cf Anne Deighton, The Foreign Policy of British Prime Minister Tony Blair: Radical or Retrograde?,
lecture at the Centre for British Studies of Humboldt University, Berlin, 11 July 2005, available as a
Working Paper at http://www.gbz.hu-berlin.de/publications/working-papers/.
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ESDI approach within the Alliance.94 As late as 1 December when the regular
Franco-German Summit meeting took place at Potsdam, the communiqué95
spoke of the EU’s accessing forces ‘through WEU’, direct from NATO, or by
using the Franco-German Eurocorps and similar pre-formed units. Just three
days after, the St Malo text made a truly decisive shift by stating that ‘the Union
must be given appropriate structures’ for developing and managing military cri-
sis management capacities, under the leadership of the European Council, ‘tak-
ing account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations
with the EU’.96 Although still somewhat gnomic, this formula made an EU-
based solution inevitable and really only left two options open: to bring WEU
inside the EU, or transfer its functions to the latter by some other means.
The path eventually followed was to be clarified step by step during 1999, the
most important public events being NATO’s Washington Summit meeting of 24
April, the European Council meeting at Köln, Germany on 3-4 June, and the
Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December where the decisions finally trig-
gering the launch of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the
EU were taken.97 WEU itself defined its part in the process by Ministerial dec-
larations issued at Bremen on 11 May and Luxembourg on 22-23 November.98
Almost equally important, however were the intense bilateral and group discus-
sions that helped to identify the route of fastest compromise, plus a unilateral
move taken by the USA when Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright pub-
lished an article titled ‘The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future’ in the
Financial Times on 7 December 1998.99 This last provides a relevant place to
start the story since it signalled the USA’s conditional acceptance of the St Malo
concept: and in retrospect, the acceptance was just as important as the condi-
tions. After all, for Europe to have ‘modern, flexible military forces […] capable
of putting out fires in Europe’s backyard’ (as Albright put it) was in the USA’s
best practical interest, and would also strengthen NATO insofar as any
improved capacities belonged to Allies. Further, Britain, France and other Euro-
pean Allies welcoming their initiative were powerful advocates in Washington
94. Richard G Whitman, Amsterdam’s Unfinished Business, as note 88 above.
95. Text in Maartje Rutten (ed.), From St Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents, WEU-ISS
Chaillot Paper no 47 of May 2001, text at http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/select_cate-
gory/21/article/from-st-malo-to-nicebreuropean-defence-core-documents/?tx_
ttnews[pS]=978303600&tx_ttnews[pL]=31535999&tx_ttnews[arc]=1&cHash=821ea7e772. This vol-
ume was the first of several similar selections of documents to be published by the ISS, continuing up to
the present and providing the single most authoritative and convenient source for research on post-St
Malo developments.
96. Franco-British Summit declaration, as in note 87 above.
97. The texts of communiqués/conclusions from these events (or relevant extracts) are most easily
accessed in Maartje Rutten (ed.), op.cit. in note 94 above: pages 20-23, 41-45 and 82-91, respectively.
98. Texts at www.weu.int/documents/990510en.pdf (Bremen) and in Maartje Rutten (ed.), op.cit, pp. 67-
76 (Luxembourg), respectively.
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and quite an influential caucus within NATO, making it rather artificial to see
the EU’s and NATO’s dialogue on the matter as two separate entities corre-
sponding remotely. (In just the same way, the winning over of all ten WEU full
members for the UK-French concept left no question that WEU would ulti-
mately suffer whatever fate the new EU logic demanded.)
What Albright laid down as conditions were the famous three D’s: no decou-
pling (i.e. NATO to be preserved as the US-Europe strategic link for ‘real’
defence), no duplication of forces/assets/procedures, and no discrimination
against the non-EU Europeans. The same three points were to be echoed, albeit
less concisely, in paragraphs 9-10 of NATO’s Washington communiqué100
where the Alliance rather remarkably responded in detail to the EU initiative
even before the latter had taken shape. On the understanding that there would
be close NATO-EU cooperation, no unnecessary duplication, and ‘the fullest
possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis operations,
building on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU’, NATO
offered not only to transfer to the EU the same understandings it had built up
with WEU but even to improve on them. The key elements in this ‘Berlin-plus’
package (so called with reference back to NATO’s Berlin Ministerial of 1996)
were defined as: assured access to NATO help in operational planning, a ‘pre-
sumption’ of access to NATO assets that might need to be borrowed, the devel-
opment of Deputy SACEUR’s role as a designated European commander who
could himself be lent for an EU-led operation, and improved defence planning
support for the development of EU intervention forces.
As for the EU’s internal deliberations during 1999, it could be argued that
respecting Albright’s first two conditions also turned out to be convenient for
the EU’s own unity and for rapid progress, but only at the price of violating the
third. On the first point, lingering ideas of bringing all WEU into the EU as a
fourth pillar or, alternatively, expressing the 10 full members’ shared European
guarantees in a protocol to the EU Treaties quickly ran into the obstacle of the
four non-Allied EU members. These were not ready to be pushed to enter a
collective defence system, but neither could they accept exclusion from an ‘inner
circle’ of ESDP101 which they could argue – not unreasonably – negated the
whole point of making the new policy a common one of the Union. Once again,
as from Maastricht onwards, Finland and Sweden suggested solving the prob-
100. NATO Summit communiqué, ‘An Alliance for the 21st Century’, 24 April 1999, text in Maartje
Rutten (ed.), op. cit., pages 20-23.
101. This would have been especially sensitive for Sweden which was also staying out of the Euro scheme
but prided itself on its role in crisis management. The non-Allies’ dilemma at this time is graphically
described in Gustav Gustenau, Towards a Common European Policy on Security and Defence: An Aus-
trian view of challenges for the “post-neutrals”, ISS Occasional Paper no. 9 of Oct. 1999, at http://
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lem by building the EU’s military competence on the basis of the Petersberg
tasks, and limiting it to those, while the MBT’s ‘real’ defence commitments
could be left behind in WEU for those Europeans who thought them important.
This solution suited London (and Washington) well, and was ultimately more
acceptable to Paris than anything that would have blurred the line between crisis
management and guaranteed defence or between the statuses of relevant partic-
ipants. For the non-Allies it made the ESDP saleable domestically, especially
when combined with the clear statement that no ‘European army’ was intended;
although the Swedes also pressed for and obtained (with British support) a par-
allel scheme to build up non-military intervention capacities.
Once ESDP was so clearly limited to crisis management actions, the risk of
duplication with NATO was also much reduced as the design of EU forces must
logically be limited to that small proportion suitable and available for external
operations. Further, the EU was ready to accept all NATO’s offers of ‘Berlin-
plus’ help, which made it likely that any early and/or particularly challenging
EU-led operations would follow a NATO design using NATO’s own crisis
management assets and/or command systems. While comforting the Atlanti-
cists, this was in fact quite a serious concern for some continental Europeans
who saw a risk of ‘NATO-ization’ spreading from the weaker WEU into the
heart of the EU itself. The issue of what operational alternatives the ESDP
should have (especially in the choice of headquarters) and how the EU’s polit-
ical control of deployments would be protected thus became very sensitive ones
in the design of ESDP, with the French and others pushing for at least some
truly ‘autonomous’ capacities to be foreseen. Part of the eventual intra-EU
compromise was to accept such necessary duplications as the creation of an EU
Military Staff and Military Committee, plus an Ambassadorial-level Political
and Security Committee that would head both the CFSP and ESDP structures
and play much the same role in overseeing deployments as NATO’s Permanent
Council. Further and most famously, the EU adopted a ‘Headline Goal’ for the
total pool of military capacities that it would wish to have available initially –
at short notice – for the potential range of Petersberg tasks, consisting of a
number of ground forces up to corps-level (up to fifteen brigades or 50-60,000
persons), plus air and naval elements and a range of especially relevant concrete
assets.102 The UK resisted, however, the creation of any new collective EU
headquarters or other standing body with large operational planning capabil-
102. See text at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf.
Although often described as an EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) on the analogy of NATO’s Response
Force (NRF) created in 2002, the Headline Goal was never envisaged as a single structured force that could
take the field together. Countries in fact offered contributions to the pool that would add up to more than
60,000, the real problems being ones of comparable quality and interoperability, and lack of some of the
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ity.103 A final point in the balance was the statement in the Helsinki conclusions
that the EU would launch operations (only) ‘where NATO as a whole is not
engaged’, ruling out at least on paper the possibility that the two institutions
would duplicate each other with actions in the field.104
The casualty in this otherwise ingenious deal was the fate of the non-EU Allies.
Had there been a distinct sub-section of ESDP reserved for fully guaranteed
states, it is plausible that some privileged link to Iceland, Norway and Turkey
could have been maintained, WEU-fashion, in that connection at least. But
when ESDP came into the joint ownership of all fifteen (at that time) EU mem-
bers, it was bound to be more closely assimilated into the legal, institutional,
personnel, and budgetary structures of the Union which – even in the intergov-
ernmental sphere of CFSP – were not noted for their flexibility. There was some
logic to this inasmuch as it facilitated the combination of military actions with
other EU inputs to a given crisis, including political and diplomatic initiatives or
various forms of aid, on which the same fifteen states and sometimes the Com-
mission would be taking decisions under established Treaty procedures. It also
meant, however, that no form of ‘ownership’ or co-decision at the policy level
could be extended to non-member states; and even at the level of individual
operations there were issues over what contributions could legally be accepted
from them, what posts their nationals could hold, and so forth. Finally, once
ESDP was implanted in the CFSP structure, the question of which nations were
important partners was bound to be influenced by the EU’s general external
relationships and in particular the rights enjoyed by recognized applicant states.
All this helps to explain – even if, for some, it could not excuse – the EU mem-
bers’ ultimate decision to create the main external consultation forum for ESDP
as a ‘plus 15’ one including all the Central European applicants, with only occa-
sional meetings reserved ‘as necessary’ for the six Associate Members of WEU.
The latter could gain further access only by opting in to individual EU opera-
tions and joining the ‘troop contributors’ mechanism, and the EU was not ini-
tially committed to accept such offers for operations that it conducted without
using NATO assets.
These terms, which were not to be spelled out in full detail until the Feira Euro-
pean Council of 19-20 June 2000,105 were clearly different from what NATO
103. The argument on these points was to persist well into the 2000s, with the British eventually ceding
the need for a proper (though civil-military) planning cell and for a separate system of EU-dedicated
deployable forces (‘Battle Groups’) in the light of experiences in 2003-4.
104. In practice, this drafting was more important for policy compromise than as a guideline for subse-
quent choices. NATO and the EU did later act in the same crises, providing roughly parallel services, in
cases such as support for African Union operations and the anti-piracy operations launched in December
2008 off Somalia.
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had asked for in April 1999. While Norway and Iceland settled down to accept
them within the framework of an improved inter-Nordic understanding,106 and
the Central European Allies then close to signing their Accession Treaties could
afford to be relaxed, Turkey saw the matter all the more seriously because of its
dissatisfaction with the EU’s treatment of its own membership application.107
Ankara decided to use its consensus rights within NATO to put a block on the
Alliance’s fulfilment of its ‘Berlin-plus’ offers, with the result that the EU lacked
the wherewithal to plan any military operations for the first two years after
Helsinki. Only in late 2002 after mediation efforts by the UK and US had arrived
at a package giving Turkey specific assurances about its strategic as well as pro-
cedural position,108 and when progress was visible in its EU membership bid,109
did Ankara relent far enough to allow the EU to work with NATO on taking
over two of the latter’s deployments in Former Yugoslavia.110 Some Turkish
procedural vetoes have however remained in place and have complicated formal
NATO-EU cooperation right up to the present.111
4.2. The dismantling of WEU
It has already been pointed out that WEU had little chance in practice of avoid-
ing whatever fate the EU Fifteen had in store for it; nor had it any real say in
what elements the ESDP would pick up from its own acquis, and how. During
106. Essentially, Norway, Denmark and Iceland agreed to help Sweden and Finland improve their status
in NATO operations while Finland and Sweden maximised Norwegian and Icelandic access to ESDP. Aly-
son JK Bailes, ‘European Security from a Nordic Perspective: The Roles for Finland and Sweden’, chapter
in Strategic Yearbook 2004, Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm 2004, pp.59-81.
107. It had first applied for EU membership in 1987, but was not acknowledged as a candidate until
December 1999.
108. The core of this so-called ‘Ankara document’ was a pledge that ESDP operations would not be car-
ried out on or against the territory of non-EU Allies: exactly the same solution that had been used to dis-
pel Turkish concerns at WEU in 1991-2. It was also agreed that Cyprus as an EU member would stay
outside the ESDP. Details are in Esra Doğan, ‘Turkey in the new European Security and Defence Architec-
ture’, Perceptions (journal of the Center for Strategic Research of the Turkish MFA), March-May 2003,
text at http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume8/March-May2003/EsraDogan.pdf.
109. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 offered to ‘open negotiations without delay’
after a new assessment of Turkey that would last until 2004, as well as endorsing the Ankara document’s
principle that ESDP operations would never be used ‘against Allies’ (on the understanding of NATO reci-
procity). Text of (revised) conclusions at http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/docs/en/council-eu-27.pdf.
110. Namely the replacement of NATO’s Op ALLIED HARMONY in FYROM by the EU’s first military
operation, OP CONCORDIA (which was succeeded by a police mission OP PROXIMA, then a police
advisory mission), and the replacement of NATO’s SFOR by the EU’s Op ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herze-
govina.
111. There have, naturally, been equally continuous discussions and efforts aimed at getting around these
purely political obstacles. For smaller and medium members of both institutions, the risk is that such frus-
trations will compound the ever-present temptation – which has only grown with NATO’s and the EU’s
numerical expansion – for larger members to cabal together outside the formal structures. In the EU’s
case, one route to explore is to make more use of the possibility to hold meetings up to PSC level in ‘troop
contributor ‘ format which would let Turkey, Norway etc. sit at the table when participating in current
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1999 it nevertheless played two roles that had a certain value: first by offering
a forum where the different groups of states in its system could exchange infor-
mation and/or let off steam about what was happening, and secondly by carry-
ing out an ‘audit’ of European crisis management capacities as an input to the
EU’s thinking on capability goals. The audit had two stages, a military stock-
taking by the WEU Planning Cell and a policy document debated at 21 which
drew conclusions about the priority areas for capacity-building. The latter was
published at the Luxembourg Ministerial in November 1999,112 and several of
its findings were in fact echoed in the terms of the EU’s Headline Goal a few
weeks later. In addition, WEU continued its ongoing operations and its exercise
schedule, which was building up to some genuinely interesting and testing joint
activities with NATO (see more on this in Section VI). In mid-1999 it transferred
to the EU a large package of its own documents designed – perhaps over-opti-
mistically – to reduce the need for reinventing the wheel.
Nothing could alter the fact, however, that from the early months of 1999 WEU
was living under a death sentence, as the emerging design of ESDP destroyed its
rationale as a political and operational entity. The roles of the WEU Council, its
committees, the Military Committee and the Planning Cell would be taken over
by the corresponding EU organs ‘at 15’: the new, Ambassador-level Political and
Security Committee (PSC) created by the Amsterdam Treaty,113 the European
Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff
(EUMS). The EU intended to bring the Institute for Security Studies114 and the
Satellite Centre under its own control as soon as the right modalities could be
found. There were no similar plans for the future of the WEU Assembly nor –
for the moment – for WEAG and WEAO; but these had been staffed by groups
separate from the main WEU secretariat and could in practice survive the drastic
pruning of the latter. To ensure that the transition was managed smoothly – i.e.
in line with EU wishes – and that a minimal institutional cover was kept for the
residual WEU elements, the ten full members decided that Javier Solana should
be appointed as the next Secretary-General of WEU as well as the EU’s new High
Representative for CFSP (a post also created with the entry into force of Amster-
dam). Solana’s term of office started in December 1999, meaning that the pre-
vious Secretary-General José Cutileiro actually had to leave one month earlier
than foreseen.
112. See note 97 above.
113. This permanent body in Brussels had been designed to supervise CFSP work and simply added ESDP
to its portfolio, later creating a Politico-Military Working Group to support it in the latter context.
114. It was agreed that the Institute would bring with it responsibility for WEU’s former Transatlantic
Dialogue (i.e. information work in the USA and Canada) on European defence.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
47
The remaining steps have been described eloquently as the ‘deconstruction’ of
WEU in André Dumoulin’s book on the subject,115 and in terms such as a ‘brutal
collapse’ and ‘political euthanasia’ in Stef Goris’ foreword to that volume.116
For anyone who held a lingering sympathy for WEU, the manner of the staged
shut-down was indeed as bitter-tasting as the substance: high decision-makers
including Solana himself had little time to spare on the nuances,117 and for some
EU officials the main aim was to prevent ESDP being ‘contaminated’ by what
was seen as a kind of virus of WEU weakness. Thus when the decision was made
to cut WEU’s civilian staff from 92 to 29 by mid-2001 and 22 in 2005 and a
‘social plan’ was adopted to provide pensions and other options,118 no special
help was offered with re-employment inside the EU and in fact only 3 persons
from WEU made that transition, through the EU’s normal entry competi-
tions.119 Rather more were able to find jobs at NATO. The residual WEU sec-
retariat was left with responsibility for pensions administration, archives, the
custody of the MBT and liaison with the Assembly; it presently moved to
smaller premises in central Brussels.
The work of the WEU Council wound down with a final Ministerial meeting at
Marseilles on 13 November 2000, where a formal end was made to WEU’s
external relationships such as the Russia and Ukraine dialogues. Meetings of
WEU’s Permanent Council could still be held but nations were often represented
there below Ambassador level. Modalities were agreed to phase out or transfer
the two ongoing WEU operations into an appropriate EU-based form. The EU’s
Treaty of Nice120 meanwhile confirmed the reconstitution of the Satellite Centre
and Institute of Security Studies as EU agencies, holding their authority from the
EU Council of Ministers via the High Representative; but for practical reasons
their new existence could start formally only from 1 January 2002.
The next stage was to come when the EU was ready to take over inter-govern-
mental work on armaments cooperation. The proposal originally contained in
the EU’s draft Constitutional Treaty (signed October 2004)121 to establish a
115. André Dumoulin, Union de l’Europe Occidentale: La Déstructuration (1998-2006), as in note 9
above. This book is the main source for the remainder of this sub-section.
116. In the original, ‘chute brutale’ and ‘euthanasie politique’. Goris was President of the WEU Assembly
at the time.
117. The same is not true of some members of Solana’s team who did their best to handle a painful situa-
tion honourably.
118. The social plan was reasonably generous and was intended to apply to any further phases of staff
reduction, but in fact when the armaments bodies closed and again in the final settlement of 2010-11,
nations chose to rewrite its provisions yet again – and not to the staff’s benefit.
119. André Dumoulin, op.cit. in note 115 above. He points out that aside from old WEU/EU staff rival-
ries and national prejudices, the EU attitude was affected by bad experiences with the incorporation of
former Schengen secretariat employees in 1999.
120. Text available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#other.
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European Defence Agency, EDA, was plucked out for early implementation by
a Council decision of 12 July 2004 as part of a programme to reaffirm and
strengthen ESDP after the Iraq-related splits of 2003. The EDA was intended to
have wide competence ranging from research to the oversight of collaborative
production, and to sweep up all previous separate cooperation initiatives. By
end-2004 the work to activate it was well in hand, and WEAG Ministers agreed
on 22 November to wind up their own institution by end-June 2005. A separate
decision was taken in May 2005 to close WEAO by end-March 2006. As with
the first phase of WEU closure, the new EU body was to be the property of EU
members alone – now numbering 25 after the 2004 enlargement – and equally
open to all of them, although Denmark chose to opt out. The EDA statutes
offered the possibility for non-EU Allies, and other interested European states
(implying Switzerland), to seek an Administrative Arrangement (AA) that
would give them considerable access to policy discussions, while buying-in to
individual projects was also an option. Norway and Turkey both applied at once
for an AA and terms of agreement were drafted with both, but while Norway’s
admission was approved in March 2006, Cyprus has blocked that of Turkey up
to the present day.122
By this stage, aside from the residual Secretariat, only the WEU Assembly was
left standing from the whole former WEU edifice. The Assembly has docu-
mented its own story in detail123 and a brief account may suffice here. While the
Assembly always depended on member states for its financing, it was in effect
left to decide its own fate in 1999 when several options might have been avail-
able in theory. Some kind of linkage with the European Parliament – which
would be gaining the same (limited) oversight over ESDP as the rest of CFSP –
was an obvious one; but whatever soundings were taken about it were not
pressed to a conclusion, probably because the WEU side would have been placed
in too much of a subordinate position. Instead the Assembly continued its work
at twice-yearly sessions and in committee, commenting freely on ESDP as well
as NATO matters, addressing recommendations to governments and inviting
EU officials to speak at its plenaries.124 It also attempted to keep up dialogue
with the WEU Council, but after the Marseilles Ministerial regularly received
the answer that relevant matters ‘were being dealt with elsewhere’.125 In 2008
122. An agreement with Switzerland is also pending. For more details see Alyson JK Bailes and Jón Á.
Gudmundsson, The European Defence Agency (EDA) and Defence Industrial Cooperation: Implications
and Options for Iceland, published online by the Institute of International Affairs at the University of Ice-
land, 2009, available at http://stofnanir.hi.is/ams/en/en/online_publications.
123. WEU Assembly, The European Defence Debate 1955-2005, as in note 9 above, and further docu-
mentation at the website http://www.assembly-weu.org.
124. Some quite high-ranking members of EU staffs accepted, but Solana himself did not attend sessions
after December 2001.
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the Assembly re-named itself the European Security and Defence Assembly
(ESDA), while continuing to use its original name in budget requests as govern-
ments did not recognize the new one. Over time its debates became more wide-
ranging as it was no longer tied down to WEU minutiae; it used its freedom to
give delegations from the WEU 27 nations more comparable status in its work,
and invited an ever widening range of observers notably from parliaments in the
Western Balkans and the former Soviet Union.51
5. WHAT NOW AND WHY NOW?
The thought of extinguishing WEU’s remnants was not a sudden inspiration in
2010, but had in fact been mooted in some quarters ever since 2002. The signif-
icance of that date was not just that the initial blockage to ESDP operations had
been overcome, but that the European Convention set up to draft an EU Con-
stitution was considering language that would include for the first time a form
of mutual defence commitment – potentially for all EU members. When the
Convention’s draft was subjected to intergovernmental negotiation in 2003,
however, this passage was both watered down and made more elaborate, mov-
ing further away in the process from the original starkness of the MBT. Thus the
Constitutional Treaty stated in Article I-41.7 that when a member state was the
subject of a military attack, other states ‘shall have towards it an obligation of
aid and assistance’, rather than ‘shall give it aid and assistance’. Another clause
provided that ‘the specific character of the defence and security policy of certain
member states’ (i.e. the non-Allies) would not be prejudiced; and it was recalled
that NATO ‘for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation
of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’.126 While the
Treaty of Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty signed on 26 February 2001127 had
also contained a saving clause for non-Allies and language recognizing NATO’s
primacy for its members, these expressions had related at the time to the general
framing of an EU defence policy (and in the Amsterdam case, the general devel-
opment of EU-WEU relations).128 Their effect when used directly to condition
the first-ever EU military ‘guarantee’ was much sharper, accentuated by the new
expression about NATO’s being the ‘forum to implement’ collective defence for
those who had already pledged it.
Despite these shortcomings – which were energetically pointed out and criticized
by the WEU Assembly129 – the Netherlands suggested to fellow-members during
its Presidency of WEU in 2004 that they should now prepare to wind up the
MBT, as soon as the new Constitution was in force. The modalities it foresaw,
starting with a public declaration by all ten states, were similar to what would
actually happen in 2010: but for the moment there was no consensus. Germany
was easily rallied to the idea of quick savings and institutional simplification,
126. For text, see note 121 above. A full and direct comparison between the language eventually retained
from the draft Constitution in the Lisbon Treaty, and article V of the MBT, is in Section VI below.
127. See note 120 above.
128. From the preamble of Article 17 of the Treaty of Nice: ‘The policy of the Union in accordance with
this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member
States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence real-
ised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compat-
ible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework’.
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but others argued for waiting until the Constitution was home and dry. Their
prudence was to be vindicated when the Treaty’s ratification process collapsed
in 2005, following negative popular referendums in the Netherlands itself and
in France.130 Luxembourg meanwhile still doubted whether the Constitution
wording provided a strong enough foundation for future European defence.131
The UK for its part was not yet ready – though its defence ministry might have
been – to abandon the buffer that WEU had historically provided against the
EU’s declaring itself a true defence community. For the moment, therefore, any
fateful decision was postponed: and postponed for several years, given the time
it took European leaders to pull themselves together and discover a way of re-
launching the constitutional venture through the Treaty of Lisbon. Yet the
steady erosion of WEU’s remaining credibility continued, not just through the
fact of the two armaments bodies’ closure in 2005-6, but through the absence
of any action to bring into the MBT those Central European states who would
have qualified for it by becoming EU as well as NA TO members in Spring
2004.132
The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in December 2007 and entering into force on 1
December 2009,133 turned out to be not just the solution to the EU’s prolonged
constitutional crisis but the final death knell for WEU. Its implications started
to be felt already before end-2009 when it proved impossible to have the new
High Representative for CFSP/CSDP, Baroness Ashton, succeed Javier Solana as
Secretary-General. The Treaty gave her the simultaneous post of a Deputy Pres-
ident of the European Commission, and Commission members were not
allowed to be double-hatted with any other institution. The solution found here
was to designate Arnaud Jacomet, head of the residual Secretary-General in
Brussels, as Acting Secretary-General (‘faisant fonction’). But it was from a dif-
ferent quarter – London, and following a different logic, that the decisive end-
game was to be launched.
In February 2010, the UK made it known to its WEU partners that it would no
longer block completion of the course that the Dutch had suggested six years
previously. Indeed, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office now urged closure
of the Assembly and the Brussels office as a rational cost-cutting measure:
130. André Dumoulin, ‘L’UEO crépusculaire’, Défense Nationale, Paris: February 2009.
131. Statement to the Assembly on 1 December 2004 by Luxembourg Defence Minister Luc Frieden,
quoted in WEU Assembly, The European Defence Debate 1955-2005, as note 9 above, p. 76.
132. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland could in principle have moved from the status of Associ-
ate Members to that of full members in WEU, and the remaining Central European states who joined
both NATO and the EU in the same ‘Big Bang’ could have moved from Associate Partner to member sta-
tus. Some of them actually enquired about making such changes, but the ten existing full members had
already decided in mid-2001 that no further shifts in membership would be countenanced. See the ‘WEU
Today’ (2009) fact-sheet at http//www.weu.int.
133. Text at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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designed to clear away redundant structures that now lacked all operational
relevance, while saving some £2.3 million per annum that had been falling on
the FCO’s own overstretched budget. The British were keen to push the matter
through to a political decision before a new government took over following the
general elections scheduled for May. They found easy acquiescence from most
of their partners, with only Belgium taking time to reflect on the implications of
obliterating an historic Treaty for which it was depositary. After just a few
weeks, on 31 March, the statement announcing the denunciation of the MBT
and the 30 June 2011 for final closure of all WEU bodies was ready for unani-
mous adoption. Belgium’s point was reflected rather gnomically in the sentence
stating – after repeating the relevant terms of the Lisbon Treaty – that ‘In this
context, we remain strongly committed to the principle of mutual defence of
article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty.’
So far the public story: but what was it, in fact, about Lisbon that finally swept
away both UK reticence and any residual value attached to the MBT in more
integrationist quarters? Here a comparison of the original MBT guarantee and
the language of the Lisbon Treaty as ratified is called for:
Figure 4: Comparison of Defence Clauses; MBT and Treaty of Lisbon
It will be seen that the Lisbon language contains no advance on the earlier Con-
stitutional Treaty; but contains the same three features qualifying the primal
clarity of the MBT: the linguistic detour ‘shall have an obligation’; the let-out
clause for the non-allies; and the clearest ever reference to NATO’s role also in
implementing intra-EU guarantees. If the ten WEU full members were able to
agree in March 2010 that this language could be accepted as an equivalent to
Modified Brussels Treaty Art. V Treaty of Lisbon Art. 42.7
‘If any of the High Contracting Parties should be
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other
High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all
the military and other aid and assistance in their
power’
‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggres-
sion on its territory, the other Member States
shall have towards it an obligation of aid and
assistance by all the means within their power, in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific char-
acter of the security and defence policy of certain
Member States. 
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall
be consistent with commitments under the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those
states which are members of it, remains the foun-
dation of their collective defence and the forum
for its implementation.’DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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the MBT, this can only logically be endorsed to the extent that the effect is equiv-
alent for them. They remain bound to each other, also within the EU, by collec-
tive defence undertakings, and even under the MBT they never had any mecha-
nism other than NATO for implementing them. It might also be understood that
they would need to use their NATO experience, assets and procedures if coming
to the aid of other EU members in a European-only emergency.134 The part of
the circle that cannot be squared, however, is the position of the six non-allied
states who do not have any collective framework either among themselves, or
through NATO, or through a specific and concrete pan-EU arrangement for
assisting other Member States as needed.135 The only possible conclusion is that
the 27-member EU of today is not a fully and mutually guaranteed collective
defence community in the sense that NATO is, or in the sense that WEU (for its
full members) was on paper and in potentia.136
Perhaps this is the simplest way to explain why the UK felt safe, at last, in 2010
to dispense with the WEU as buffer. If after one whole decade of ESDP there was
no consensus, or even any serious proposal, within the EU to advance the level
of ambition on European defence policy beyond the Lisbon formula, London
could reasonably abandon its last fears of direct EU competition with NATO
and/or the ‘communitarization’ of military business.137 Such a judgement would
also make sense in terms of more general institutional fortunes and dynamics. It
is starting to be widely recognized that CSDP has hit a phase of the doldrums
since 2008-9, with few new operations undertaken138 and even fewer being
planned. Military ambitions do not seem to figure largely in the agenda of Bar-
oness Ashton and her staff, and member states’ appetites for military adventure
in any context have been hit by the triple whammy of the economic crash, reac-
tion against the perceived errors of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fact that the
ISAF burden still has to be borne. The fact that the EU as well as NATO was
134. This raises some delicate issues, however, about the use of British nuclear weapons, which are for-
mally dedicated to its Allies’ defence in NATO but which some EU members would very strongly object to
being associated with or legitimizing.
135. In this last respect there is an interesting contrast between Article 42.7 and the non-military ‘solidar-
ity’ commitment in Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty, which will be reverted to below.
136. The same conclusion was reached in an earlier study by the French Senate on the draft Constitution
which also provided the obvious explanation: ‘The mutual defence clause […] is worded in such a way as
to be acceptable to everyone’. Cited in WEU Assembly, The European Defence Debate 1955-2005 (as
note 9 above), pp 76-77.
137. This outcome was foreseen with uncanny prescience in 1998 by Remacle and Dumoulin (L’Union de
l’Europe Occidentale: Phénix de la defense européenne, as in note 9 above, p. 406), when they speculated
that WEU’s disappearance might also constitute its revenge, doing away simultaneously with ‘tout project
politique supranational pour l’Union européenne et de toute défense européenne autonome’ (any EU
political identity of a supranational kind, and any autonomous European defence).
138. The only new mission launched in 2010 was a military training effort in Somalia with maximum 104
personnel, linked to the naval operation Atalanta against Somali pirates which had been running since
2008. See however note 139 on the authorization of a humanitarian operation for Libya.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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spurred to action in the Libyan crisis (March/April 2011) does not alter this big
picture but rather proves it as an exception.139 The USA’s low profile in this
instance, the strenuous efforts made to avoid mission creep, and the lack of
kinetic intervention in the many other concurrent Arab-world disorders all point
to a still prudent and ambivalent underlying Western mood.
Of course the same factors are also or even more directly affecting NATO; but
the Alliance has faced up to its problems since 2009 through the exercise to draft
a new Strategic Concept, and produced a skilful new policy synthesis that was
celebrated at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit in a spirit of both intra-Allied
and NATO-Russia reconciliation.140 The Summit follow-up includes elements,
such as a root-and-branch review of NATO’s strategic posture and an attempt
to devise a truly collective missile defence programme, that may be daunting and
highly sensitive but still pose a more fascinating challenge for defence profes-
sionals than anything to be found in CSDP’s own post-Lisbon agenda. On the
operational front, meanwhile, NATO again showed its ability to overcome seri-
ous obstacles to consensus when it reached agreement on the Libyan operation
just mentioned. If the viability of NATO’s new stance rests partly on a modera-
tion of its recent ambitions in those ‘new’ security areas where the EU clearly
has better tools (notably energy), it seems equally clear that the EU can leave and
will be leaving the business of ‘real’ defence in Europe to ‘the other side of Brus-
sels’ for quite some years to come.
To those looking from London, this might provoke the remark ‘‘Twas ever
thus’; but for most of the past 65 years that has hardly been the view of Paris.
It is equally relevant to ask, therefore, why France in 2010 should finally for-
sake the MBT as the last relic of post-WWII visions of a truly European
defence: and the simple answer may be that the decision was taken quickly at
the highest possible level. The French President’s office has often shown itself
more pragmatic – and more inclined to find common ground with London –
in matters of defence than for instance the Quai d’Orsay, and President
Sarkozy has from the first shown a distinct disregard for convention. Some
logical link may then be seen between the Franco-British collusion on ending
WEU, and the striking advances in bilateral defence (including nuclear) coop-
eration that came into the open with the Franco-British Treaty signed in
139. In March 2011 NATO assumed command of the military enforcement aspects of UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1973, leading to a number of air strikes against Colonel Gaddafi’s assets, while the EU
shortly after decided to authorize an operation (EUFOR Libya) in support of the UN’s humanitarian
efforts in and around Libya and to assist displaced persons (details at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/121237.pdf).
140. For the text of the New NATO Strategic Concept (‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’) see http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68172.htm, while the Lisbon Summit Declaration is at http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-122B8F1E-03EB54BA/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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November the same year.141 More broadly, French perceptions must also have
been affected by the recent loss of momentum in CSDP, and the continuing
reticences (both political, and in terms of defence spending and reform) among
Germany and many smaller European states on which this may partially be
blamed. Since its return to NATO’s Integrated Military Structure in 2009 it is
natural that France should be more aware of and invest more energy in its role
there, while its deep involvement in the ISAF operation has given its military
a challenge and also a sense of achievement that nothing in CSDP today could
match. In sum, the present pattern of French and British behaviour may be
seen as reversion to one of their longer-term default positions as the two ‘bigs’
leading European multinational cooperation in a robust but still distinctly
national style. It provokes the reflection that if Franco-British divisions are
always bad for progress in institutionalizing European defence, it can some-
times be bad as well as good for that process to have the two capitals agree.142
At all events, the effects of the March 2010 decision have become irreversible
with the completion of all national procedures to denounce the MBT. The prac-
tical consequences have been handled by the relevant nations’ CFSP teams in
Brussels, and have turned out more troublesome than probably anyone imag-
ined during the hasty drafting of the 31 March statement. Giving notice to the
WEU staffs in Brussels and at the Assembly has been almost the easiest part, but
has led to rancour as the member states chose yet again to re-write the 2000
‘social plan’ and there have been some claims of unequal treatment. The Palais
d’Iéna where the WEU Assembly has been meeting should in principle be bought
back by France which would then have to lease out part of it again to the EU
Institute for Security Studies. A home has still to be found for the WEU archives,
which include highly classified NATO materials and for which two member
states have been competing. Even more complicated is the identification of a
repository institution, including all the WEU member states and having suitable
legal personality, that can take over the obligation to pay WEU pensions for the
rest of recipients’ lives (and to deal with any legal disputes arising). If time is
starting to look worryingly short before the 30 June 2011 deadline, changing
141. Details in the Franco-British Summit Declaration on Security and Defence Cooperation, 2 November
2010, at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/11/uk%E2%80%93france-
summit-2010-declaration-on-defence-and-security-co-operation-56519. See also Ben Jones, Franco-Brit-
ish military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?, EU Institute for Security Studies Occa-
sional Paper no 88 of Feb. 2011, text at http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/article/franco-
british-military-cooperation-a-new-engine-for-european-defence/.
142. Geoff Hoon, ‘Why their EU and NATO partners may look askance at the Franco-British defence
pact’ in Europe’s World (Spring 2011), text available at http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/
Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21786/language/en-US/
WhytheirEUandNATOpartnersmaylookaskanceattheFrancoBritishdefencepact.aspx. The implications
for EU defence industrial collaboration will be taken up in section VI below.DEATH OF AN INSTITUTION – THE END FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, A FUTURE FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE?
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the date or ‘stopping the clock’ is also too difficult to contemplate after the
timetable has been sanctified in national Treaty denunciation procedures.
The largest single issue arising has been how to deal with the Parliamentary
dimension of European defence work after the disappearance of the ESDA/WEU
Assembly, which will say its farewells with a ceremony at Paris (Palais d’Iéna)
on 9-10 May. The Lisbon Treaty does not give the European Parliament any new
competences in the field of security and defence, and the EP itself has recently
considered and rejected the idea of creating a full Committee on Defence to
stand alongside that on Foreign Affairs. (The latter’s sub-committee for security
and defence, SEDE, which at present works both on ‘positive’ defence and arms
control/export control issues, will be strengthened instead.) Some member
states, including Britain, have all along argued that scrutiny of such a core sov-
ereign power as defence should be a matter first and last for national parlia-
ments; the more so as national constitutional provisions in this area vary widely.
The question of whether and how the national parliamentarians specializing in
this field might themselves get together has been on the table since the early
2000s, and the WEU Assembly put forward a series of proposals for an EU-
linked inter-parliamentary process in 2004 when it deplored the absence of spe-
cific provisions to this end in the Constitutional Treaty143 The Lisbon Treaty
duly added a provision encouraging systematic contacts between the national
parliaments of EU nations,144 and this is the direction in which efforts to find a
successor to the WEU Assembly are looking now. The former MBT governments
have meanwhile stressed that they recognize the importance of parliamentary
cooperation and of a more-than-national debate; but that it is up to parliamen-
tarians themselves to decide what to do about this, and under no circumstances
will a new institution as such be financed.
Several debates have taken place in national parliaments, and corresponding
schemes have been published, to this end since early 2010.145 They all focus on
the same issues: how to provide practical support for inter-parliamentary meet-
ings at minimum cost, with no fixed seat and no dedicated staff; how frequent
the meetings should be and whether and how the venue should rotate; how
many MPs to invite from each nation and how many MEPs should join them;
whether representatives should be invited from additional (i.e. non-EU) states
and on what basis. Most if not all WEU full members would wish Norway and
143. WEU Assembly, The European Defence Debate 1955-2005, as note 9 above, pp 74-75 and 81-2.
144. Protocol 1 on the role of national parliaments in the EU, attached to the Lisbon Treaty (as note 133
above)
145. Details up to end-2010 are in ESDA/WEU Assembly Document C/2088 of 3 Nov. 2010, ‘Implement-
ing the Lisbon Treaty: ongoing debates in the national parliaments on monitoring CSDP’, Report by the
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Turkey, as a minimum, to continue to have access, and the Turkish ESDA dele-
gation has also made its case to this effect:146 but once the starting-point for
participation is EU membership the risk of blocking action by one or more mem-
ber states is clear. Other obvious questions are how widely the potential agenda
of such meetings should range, what outputs are expected and to whom/where
any recommendations arising should be addressed. A more political issue is how
closely the new process should be tied to the European Parliament itself, and
some elements in the EP remain very sensitive to any notion of a new ‘rival’
being created elsewhere. On the other hand the UK, for one, has stated starkly
that it will not accept any outcome that gives the EP any new advantages in the
defence field.147
Discussions on a workable compromise were scheduled to start in a forum that
combines the Speakers of national EU parliaments and the EP, COSAC, in April
2011. One model put forward by the Belgian Parliament,148 which would prima
facie ease EP concerns about control, is to hold the inter-parliamentary meetings
in Brussels with the EP’s own staff providing services and with a number of
MEPs equivalent to one third of the total national delegates attending. If it
proved more widely acceptable this would have the merit of allowing a fairly
rapid transition, without the extended hiatus that arguably caused valuable
ground to be lost at other stages and in other areas of the WEU-to-EU handover.
On the other hand, the more closely the new scheme is tied into EU structures,
the more problematic the handling of relations with non-member states’ parlia-
ments – especially Turkey – is likely to be; and it is not clear how much leeway
if any there is in the UK position on EP involvement.149
146. The Turkish position is contained in a letter to the President of the Assembly. As for WEU member
states’ views, the Presidency statement on WEU closure (note 3 above) calls for inter-parliamentary dia-
logue ‘including with candidates for EU accession and other interested states’.
147. Answers given by Minister for Europe Christ Bryant in the House of Commons on 6 April, text at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm100406/debtext/100406-0001.htm.
148. Draft resolution tabled by MM André Flahaut and François-Xavier de Donnea, Belgian Chamber of
Representatives, 11 February 2011, doc.no. 53 1196/001.
149. The British House of Lords’ recommendation for future inter-parliamentary meetings (as reported in
the ESDA/WEU Assembly report cited in note 145 above) would exclude holding meetings on EP
premises or with help from EP staff, though a small number of MEPs would be allowed to sit in.59
6. ATTEMPTING A BALANCE-SHEET
‘The Western European Union has made an important contribution to
peace and stability in Europe and to the development of the European
security and defence architecture, promoting consultations and coopera-
tion in this field, and conducting operations in a number of theatres,
including Petersberg tasks’.
WEU Presidency statement of 31 March 2010, as note 3 above.
‘Most organizations that have been dissolved have found a new life in a
successor. Their ‘soul’ lives on, albeit subject to a new institutional frame-
work, new rules and possibly at the service of new masters.’
Ramses A Wessel, op. cit. in note 5 above.
This section has the complex task of drawing up an overall assessment of WEU’s
lifetime achievement, with special attention to the legacy it has left – or rather
legacies, given its stage-by-stage closure – for European cooperation in external
policy, security and defence. What from the WEU tradition has been conserved
in new hands and new forms, thereby contributing to these purposes today and
enhancing the chances of success in the future? And has anything been lost, in
terms of elements of real value that WEU’s inheritors could not or would not
salvage from its ruins?
6.1. WEU’s Positive Legacy
This topic will be divided in turn into conceptual and policy elements, including
political relationships as appropriate; institutional tools and practices; and oper-
ational/military elements. The first two aspects may be handled summarily, as
so much of the ground has been covered in the historical context above; but the
last is a less familiar story that merits detailed attention.
6.1.1. Concepts and Policy
Even if the credit strictly belongs to Western Union rather than WEU, the orig-
inal Brussels Treaty of 1948 achieved a true historic breakthrough by creating a
permanent, active and fully institutionalized collective defence relationship
among a core set of Europeans. Without it NATO might not have been possible,
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– giving Europe a ‘sense of self’,150 as it were – in the security field. After
NATO’s creation and the failure of the European Defence Community, WEU
proper was born as a self-avowed second-best, yet its usefulness is undeniable in
handling some of the more tricky intra-European aspects of the transition
towards a fully integrated Federal Republic of Germany. The Saar settlement
and the completion of German disarmament obligations may be mentioned to
its credit here; and in the latter context WEU was one of the first 20th-century
bodies to develop modern techniques of verification, for the elimination of
chemical as well as conventional weapons.
WEU’s role after its first revival, in the decade from 1984, is commonly summed
up as a ‘talking shop’. The judgement is accurate, but need not be dismissive.
The last decade of the Cold War was a time of new tensions both across the
Atlantic and within Europe, some factors in which – such as new twists in East-
West relations, and rising security threats that cut across the bipolar order –
were not easy to address either within NATO or in the European political frame-
work as it stood at that time. Both the US-European strategic relationship, and
the interplay between the Euro-Atlantic space and the rest of the world, called
for redefinition as a final set of cracks began to open in the Soviet empire and
the Western colonial era also approached its end. It is interesting to note that
these were precisely the years when the meetings of the Group of Seven indus-
trialized nations (G7) began to develop a substantial politico-strategic agenda
alongside their economic role, offering a privileged forum where Japan could be
consulted as well.151 For the ‘core’ group of Europeans, being able to use WEU
as an additional place of concertation (soon with defence ministers also present)
brought real if unquantifiable advantages in managing their role in all the other
institutions. Its net effect was twofold: to draw European stances on the difficult
West-West issues towards a middle ground that reduced the risk of rupture with
the USA; but at the same time, to strengthen the sense of specifically European
shared interests and values in security. The ambiguity was clear here that had
belonged to notions of a ‘European pillar’ in Western defence from the very
start. If WEU could do little to prevent the same ambiguity from becoming even
more open, and occasionally more divisive, over the following two decades, at
least its configuration ensured that the UK would be present within the Euro-
pean camp and stay involved in shaping the European defence identity. Without
that fact, it might not have been so easy for the EU to develop its role on a
150. An expression used by an official interviewed in February 2011 for the present study.
151. The first significant non-economic declaration by the G7 came at the Williamsburg summit of 1983
which addressed questions of strategic arms control and called for greater cooperation with the Soviet
Union. In the following years the G7 also helped to handle US demands for tougher anti-terrorist meas-
ures. See Nicholas Bayne and Robert D. Putnam, Hanging in there: The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity
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consensus basis as it did through to the Helsinki decisions on ESDP and indeed,
right up to the Lisbon Treaty.152
Once the Cold War was over, WEU reflected in a minor key the remarkable
success that both NATO and the EU were to achieve in re-justifying their exist-
ence, readjusting their agendas and finally absorbing the greater part of the
European continent. It has been argued above that in terms of membership
expansion and of reacting to the new demands of crisis management, WEU’s
low political profile and non-legalistic way of exploring new activities153 gave it
the flexibility to play a modest but useful pioneer role. Its early engagement with
the Central Europeans and the West European non-Allies prepared them in a
practical way for the serious business of NATO/EU enlargement and for the
appropriate degrees of military integration, first in NATO-led and later also in
ESDP operations. Its formulation of the Petersberg tasks as the appropriate
spectrum for separate European crisis missions, drafted as early as 1992 when
the formative lessons of the Former Yugoslavian wars still lay in the future, was
to prove remarkably shrewd and robust as a basis for European political con-
sensus as well as for concrete actions. In retrospect, the secret of the WEU for-
mula was perhaps that it kept a normatively acceptable tone and was weighted
towards altruistic tasks, while at the same time leaving leeway both for more
self-interested (rescue and evacuation) missions and for those at the sharper end
of military crisis management. What is less often noted is that the WEU (and
later, EU) doctrine was exactly ten years ahead of NATO in allowing operations
with no geographical restriction, literally world-wide.154
In a decade dominated by the harsh Former Yugoslavian experience and the
outright combat of the Gulf War, WEU’s actual operations of the 1990s looked
feeble indeed. Only in retrospect can it be seen that they laid the necessary
ground-work not only for European-led police and civilian missions of the kind
152. The notable thing about occasional Franco-German-led ventures attempting to move European
defence forward without the UK – such as the ‘pralines summit’ with Belgium and Luxembourg in April
2003 that agreed i.a. on a permanent European command HQ – was their lack of consequences and,
indeed, their failure to achieve broader European buy-in. To note as much is not to idealize the British
role, as London also had its own ways of sabotaging such attempts.
153. It was in fact an interesting question whether the Petersberg formula had any legal base: see Ramses
A. Wessel, ‘The legality for the new functions of Western European Union: The attribution of powers
reconsidered on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Brussels Treaty’ in Anne Deighton and Eric
Remacle (eds.), The Western European Union, 1948-1998: from the Brussels Treaty to the Treaty of
Amsterdam, as in note 9 above.
154. The possibility and justification for NATO to operate outside its traditional geographical area was
still somewhat unclear in the 1999 Strategic Concept, and the Alliance’s first document formally allowing
Treaty-based operations anywhere in the globe was adopted in mid-2002 as part of the reactions to 9/11.
In the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and 1999 Helsinki decisions the EU mentioned no specific
areas of application for the Petersberg tasks and cited only the principles of the UN and OSCE as legal/
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that would later dominate the early phases of ESDP, but also for grappling with
the command and control implications of mixed civil-military interventions by
a single Western institution.155 While more will be said about this under the
military/operational heading below, it is worth adding here that the operational
record of ESDI – the European Security and Defence Identity based within
NATO, which inspired so much effort in the 1990s including the formulation of
NATO’s Berlin decisions in 1996 – was precisely zero. If NATO had not brought
itself to agree upon the principle of lending its skills and assets to a European
sub-set of nations, not only would large military actions in the ESDP framework
have been impractical, but the EU’s decisions on self-militarization could have
strained US-European relations to breaking point. Yet NATO itself never invited
WEU to take on such tasks as the EU did in 1998-99, nor did it ever carry out
one of its own interventions through a European-led coalition. The possible
explanations for that lie outside the framework of this study;156 yet the effect
was that the full burden of European operational experimentation in the 1990s
– aside from purely national initiatives like Turquoise and Alba – was left upon
WEU’s narrow shoulders. If the EU was not to pick up its new military role
entirely from scratch, it was good that WEU at least attempted something; and
in the process, started the accumulation of European operational do’s and
don’ts.
Of course, WEU’s actions during this period were ultimately less important than
the concepts, agreements and analyses that it developed or stimulated the two
larger institutions to develop, from the time of Maastricht and Berlin onwards.
If a dog can train its master, it may be said with only a little exaggeration that
WEU trained both NATO and the EU to work with it – at the cost, no doubt, of
much friction and frustration – in a way that greatly eased their eventual adjust-
ment to each other. Aside from the Petersberg formula and the WEU member-
ship practices that allowed the related work to be done and lessons to be learned
in this most inclusive way possible, WEU’s efforts underpinned at least four of
the strands later combining to make ESDP workable. One was the formulation
and identification of European command and HQ requirements; one was the
development of a procedural and legal framework for NATO’s defence planning
and operation planning support and the loan of NATO assets; one – perhaps the
trickiest! – was the injection of military needs and ways into the EU’s decision-
making structure; and the last in time sequence was the charting of European
operational capability shortfalls, notably through the 1998 Audit process. In
155. The UN had of course for some time faced this challenge and OSCE could in theory have done so,
but never launched a military intervention in practice.
156. Some hints, from a British standpoint, were given in Alyson J.K. Bailes, ‘WEU: A British perspective’
in Anne Deighton, Western European Union 1954-1997: Defence, Security, Integration, as note 9 above,
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none of these fields did the EU in fact attempt to reinvent the wheel, despite the
aversion of some of ESDP’s creators to WEU ‘contamination’ as mentioned
above. The continuity between the make-up of EU member states’ teams serving
WEU and the EU’s new PSC, as well as the few WEU staff who ended up at
relevant NATO and EU desks, ensured that most WEU lessons would be carried
forward in substance if not in form. The only cases of relatively complete breaks
are the changes in national status for non-EU NATO and non-NATO EU states,
as already sufficiently discussed, and the system of operational financing which
had to be addressed afresh in the EU’s own Byzantine budgetary framework.157
One last political aspect worth noting briefly is the WEU relationship with the
Russian Federation and the Ukraine, both of which were accorded policy dia-
logues during the 1990s and were allowed considerable insight into WEU activ-
ities, including an element of observation at the latest WEU exercises.158 Both
Eastern neighbours maintained a friendly tone in their dealings, in Russia’s case
no doubt partly in hopes of weaning the Europeans away from NATO, but also
because they transparently had nothing to fear from a body with WEU’s limita-
tions. For Ukraine, learning more about the European dimension of defence was
also relevant to its own strivings after a more ‘Western’ identity. Both partners
offered airlift for potential WEU operations and Russia kept probing the oppor-
tunities for defence industrial cooperation. If none of these overtures came to
anything much, they may have had some marginal effect in familiarizing Mos-
cow with the notion of a European defence identity that was neither threatening
for itself nor by definition anti-American. Once the EU took on the European
defence mantle, it was relatively easy to keep similar perceptions alive against
the background of its own largely cooperative security relationships with both
Moscow and Kyiv.
6.1.2. Institutional Tools and Practices
One of the most often recurring arguments among Europeans over their way
forward on defence concerned the value of institution-building. Was it a distrac-
tion, a source of imaginary achievements and an encouragement to over-’theo-
logical’ thinking as the British often claimed; or was it essential for coherence,
157. The outcome was the ATHENA financing mechanism introduced in 2004 and updated in 2008,
which covers only specified ‘common costs’; the official factsheet is at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
showPage.aspx?id=746&lang=EN.
158. For a snapshot of these relationships see the communiqué of the WEU Ministerial meeting at Paris,
May 1997 (text at www.weu.int/documents/970513en.pdf), which was followed by an internal study on
how to optimize and balance the two. A further innovative WEU partnership was its Mediterranean dia-
logue with North African and Middle Eastern states, which helped to shape the subsequent NATO initia-
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continuity and maintaining standards, the only way to amass both concrete joint
capacities and esprit du corps? In the specific defence and security field the UK
and other more Atlanticist states were additionally on their guard against what
they saw as duplication of NATO, while others thought rather in terms of com-
pleting gaps within the emergent EU structure. Finally, countries were divided
over their approach to institutional budgets, with the UK being joined by the
usually more pro-European Germans in trying to keep costs to a minimum, and
advocating ‘zero growth’ in finance even while condoning increases in institu-
tional tasks.
The story has been told in sections IV.2 and V above of how WEU’s main insti-
tutional features, first its working Council structure and Planning Cell, and
finally its Assembly, fell victim to nations’ preference for institution-building in
the EU framework combined with overall cost-cutting zeal. Yet two of WEU’s
institutional creations, the Institute for Security Studies and the Satellite Centre,
were to survive in new EU clothing, and the armaments bodies WEAG and
WEAO provided at least some of the building blocks for the EU’s European
Defence Agency (EDA). Why did they merit preservation, and can they be
counted among WEU’s positive legacies for the EU-led defence and security
enterprise?
The Institute for Security Studies had no parallel in either NATO or the earlier
EU system, where research and policy planning functions were internal to the
given organization. As an independent body, further distanced from executive
meddling by its site in Paris, it could build an intellectual reputation that
attracted serious experts to its staff and its conferences and plenty of readers to
its publications.159 Aside from whatever value it could bring in informing actual
policy-making, it thus served WEU well as a tool of outreach and public infor-
mation, and as a networking partner that could build equally strong relation-
ships with WEU members and other important actors, including the US, Can-
ada, Russia and Japan. Recognition of this last factor was shown by the decision
to place full responsibility for ‘transatlantic dialogue’ with the institute at the
time of the EU transfer.160
159. A wise decision of the Institute was to make all its publications including the major series of ‘Chail-
lot Papers’ freely downloadable on-line.
160. Despite initial suggestions that this dialogue might include official encounters, it settled down to be
based on two annual seminars that attracted high-quality US attendance, and were later held alternately
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Figure 5: Directors of the WEU and EU Institute for Security Studies
The transfer itself, however, proved to be not without difficulties. The Joint
Action of the EU Council of Ministers giving the Institute its new status as an
independent agency of the Council was not adopted until 20 July 2001,161 and
implemented the following year. This left the Institute in limbo for a while, albeit
giving plenty of time to prepare for the new EU environment. The changes
brought by the latter were less significant in the Institute’s own shape and activ-
ities162 than in the institutional dynamics of its situation. While care had been
taken not to subordinate it to any body below Council level (with High Repre-
sentative Javier Solana as line manager), its whole rationale was that it should
commune with and inform EU policy-making and the related debates, and this
link to an institution far more powerful than WEU raised its profile and its
attractions for foreign partners accordingly. However, it was not always clear
whether EU governments and their Brussels representatives understood how to
make best use of such an unfamiliar adjunct to their work. When some states
encouraged the Institute to play roles of real policy significance, such as produc-
ing a ‘White Paper’ for European defence, others weighed in to curb the risks of
innovation through a channel that might elude Brussels’ normal checks and bal-
ances and means of control. There was particular nervousness about the Insti-
tute’s becoming a conduit for direct dialogue among defence ministries. In the
outcome, the White Paper exercise was completed by an independent expert
task force and the resulting publication in 2004 was called ‘European Defence:
a proposal for a White Paper’ (authors’ italics).163 Implicit limits were set that
the Institute has not subsequently transgressed, although most recently there has
been some move to speed up its commentaries on events driving real-time EU
decision-making.164
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161. A revised version was adopted in December 2006.
162. The number of researchers remained modest (fewer than ten) but could now be recruited from all EU
states, with all contributing to the budget on a GDP scale. As before, visiting researchers from non-mem-
ber states could and did also contribute to the Institute’s work.
163. Text available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/books/.
164. For the Institute’s own assessment of its adjustment to EU ownership see The European Union Insti-
tute for Security Studies 2002-2006: five years for the EU, EU-ISS: Paris, 2006. The issue of the Institute’s
being based outside Brussels has never quite been off the agenda but as yet no consensus has emerged for
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The Satellite Centre’s (Satcen’s) role within WEU did not involve the develop-
ment and ownership of actual satellite systems, but rather the collating and anal-
ysis of satellite imagery and its application for a range of operational, as well as
monitoring and intelligence, purposes in crisis management – a relatively new
and imaginative venture at the time of its first creation (1993). It first won wide-
spread plaudits for its satellite mapping services at the time of the Kosovo con-
flict. Although the Satcen had to wait, like the Institute, until 1 January 2002
for its full translation into an EU agency, the change did open up a much wider
field for the application of its services. In the first place it could support the EU’s
proliferating military and civilian missions with geographical and imagery intel-
ligence (GEOINT/IMINT) relevant both to situational awareness and to their
own movements and contingency planning. Secondly it could provide data and
analysis in other fields of EU security concern and competence such as WMD
proliferation monitoring, industrial sites analysis, border monitoring, maritime
surveillance, and tasks related to counter-terrorism. In the process the Satcen has
strengthened its capacity for continuous operation while remaining a highly
secure environment where sensitive information from all partners can be pro-
tected. It engages with EU member states and the high-level decision making-
process in the Council, as well as with the relevant bodies of the CFSP/CSDP
structure in Brussels. At the same time, it should be noted that in the EU setting,
the Satcen’s position has become a relatively minor and specialized one among
the multitude of other relevant bodies, policies and assets comprising the
Union’s evolving space policy. It is, for example, rare to find it even mentioned
in the communications on space policy of the Commission’s Directorate-General
for Industry and Enterprise.165 One may thus suspect that the Satcen has been
left with some still unfulfilled potential in the shadow of more highly publicized
and controversial EU projects like the Galileo programme.166
Assessing the transfer of armaments work from WEU to the EU is a more com-
plex matter because it involved greater structural changes. The competences of
both WEAG and WEAO were absorbed into the European Defence Agency
(EDA),167 while at the same time – from the mid-2000s onwards – the European
Commission was making new strides in its long-cherished ambition to promote
defence collaboration through the prism of research, industrial, and competition
policies. This very fact underlines that in the EU environment, the operational
logic of joint defence research, production, and procurement programmes could
165. See the latest proposals on European space policy published by the Commission on 4 April 2011, at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/index_en.htm. Thus far the EU’s main partnership in
developing its overall policy has been with the independent European Space Agency (ESA).
166. Galileo is a global navigation satellite system providing a highly accurate global positioning service,
but operated – unlike the US GPS – under civilian control. Details available at http://www.esa.int.
167. For details of the EDA’s functions and its own progress reports and bulletins see http://
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be brought into synergy with general research policy and with financial, com-
mercial and industrial competences of a sort never available to NATO, let alone
to WEU. The EU is also uniquely equipped to work on the development of high
technology that has multiple applications, including civil alongside military
ones. Structurally, the coexistence of EDA and the Commission has elements of
complementarity as well as competition: both aspire to make the EU’s internal
defence market more integrated and efficient, which the Commission seeks by
easing internal trade and making procurement more competitive,168 while the
EDA formulates guidelines both for inter-governmental efforts and company
behaviour in this sphere.169 Last but not least, the EU is the place where stand-
ards are set for its members on the responsible export of conventional weapons
and the banning of ‘inhumane’ items,170 thus allowing the whole arms cycle to
be addressed – at least in principle – in a way that balances operational and
economic gains against the strategic and normative arguments for restraint.171
All this said, it would be vain to pretend that the serious long-term obstacles to
progress in European armaments collaboration have been swept away or even
significantly undermined by the EU’s achievement of a near-monopoly in such
work.172 The history of the EDA itself illustrates how states can still remain at
cross-purposes: the UK has persistently sought to curtail its size, its budget and
its ambitions for direct management of cooperative programmes.173 Concerns
about possible overlap or conflict with NATO projects have not quite been put
to bed, though the Agency would claim that it has reached a good understanding
with ‘the other side of Brussels’, for instance on burden-sharing in work on
168. This has been attempted notably through two defence market directives drafted by the Commission
in 2007 following consultation on a ‘Green Paper’ of 2004, and which are now coming into force: for
details and critique see the Flemish Peace Institute’s The European Defence Package: towards a liberaliza-
tion and harmonization of the European defence market, Brussels: April 2008, text at http://www.flem-
ishpeaceinstitute.eu/get_pdf.php?ID=201&lang=EN.
169. See http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=153.
170. Conventional exports are subject to a Common Position of the Council adopted in December 2008
to replace an earlier, less-binding Code of Conduct: full details are at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
showPage.aspx?id=1484&lang=en. EU nations have collectively promoted and acceded to several global
international-legal measures on specific ‘inhumane’ items such as landmines, blinding lasers and cluster
munitions, while the export of actual and potential instruments of torture from the EU is prohibited
under EU Council Regulation 1236/2005.
171. Flemish Peace Institute, The EU defence market: balancing effectiveness with responsibility, Brussels,
2011 (forthcoming)
172. On the progress made and remaining problems see Nick Witney (the EDA’s first Director), Re-ener-
gising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy, European Council on Foreign Relations July 2008, text at
http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ESDP-report.pdf; Jean-Perre Darnis et al, Lessons learned from European
defence equipment projects, EU-ISS Occasional Paper of October 2007, at http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/
actualites/analysisbooks/select_category/10/article/lessons-learned-from-european-defence-equipment-
programmes/?tx_ttnews[pS]=1167606000&tx_ttnews[pL]=31535999&tx_
ttnews[arc]=1&cHash=96f43c21ab; and the many relevant EU-ISS publications authored by Burkard
Schmit.
173. The UK has always also been sensitive about Commission encroachment in this field, against which
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helicopters. If the EDA were to stay meticulously within the bounds of EU com-
petence, however, this would pose its own limitations since CSDP in general and
the Headline Goal targets address only the demands of crisis management, not
the design of any state’s complete arsenal or force structure. Another effect of
pooling all previous initiatives into the EU framework has been that all policy
work must be conducted in a forum of 26 states,174 where the contrasts between
a few large producers and the rest are sharper and any sense of special expertise
and common purpose can too easily evaporate. As a matter of observation, not
so many National Armaments Directors now come in person to EDA meetings
as used to take part in WEAG, perhaps because it is harder to talk frankly and
flexibly about the big issues or to make useful horse-trades. And finally, just as
in the main CSDP setting, slowness and reluctance by EU elites to pick the useful
plums out of WEU experience has probably reduced the effectiveness of EDA
learnings, in particular from the achievements of WEAO.
The greatest problems in this field of course remain quite other, including the
continuing strength of the national prerogative – still recognized in Article 346
of the Treaty of Lisbon;175 the habits and pressures conspiring to push serious
cooperation towards smaller groups; the ambivalence of the US-European rela-
tionship, and the vagaries of corporate dynamics and the market itself. Since
2008, the economic crash has cast a powerful shadow over the defence industry
like any other: in principle it should sharpen the pressure for concentration, but
in practice financial stringency seems more often to mean cutbacks in or with-
drawals from joint projects, and a reduced inclination to pay premiums just to
advance the pan-European cause or be nice to smaller producers. In early 2011,
the significance of the Anglo-French defence cooperation treaty of November
2010 was still being hotly debated against this background.176 Aside from its
operational impact, was it a setback to the European armaments collaboration
enterprise because it showed two leading players yet again going it alone outside
the institutional framework? Or was it, on the contrary, a positive breakthrough
because it showed even the largest states admitting their deficiencies and inter-
dependence, and moving purposefully towards solutions that should be more
‘integrated’ as well as efficient and cost-effective? The truest, if least dramatic,
interpretation would probably be that the French and British actions are neutral
per se for the EDA itself and for trends in European defence market regulation
174. 26 not 27 because of the Danish opt-out from EDA.
175. This article reproduces without change an article included in all former treaties (Article 296 of the
Treaty of Nice) which allows any Member State to ‘take such measures as it considers necessary for the
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in
arms, munitions and war material’, thus preventing the automatic application of single market and com-
petition policy principles to the defence field.
176. Ben Jones, Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?, as in note 141
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and management more generally. They have not contravened any EU rules nor
taken away existing work from the EDA. Whether they will inspire and/or pro-
voke broader European progress must depend, aside from their own success, on
how other actors respond to them and on how hard institutional leaders try to
instrumentalize them in a common interest. The odds on that in turn remain as
open, and uncertain, as they are for the fate of CSDP in general.
6.1.3. Operational and Military Elements
All practical problems aside, the most fundamental weakness of WEU was the
view widely held in European capitals, particularly amongst senior foreign
affairs and military personalities, that it was simply not fit to be entrusted with
‘serious’ crisis management operations. This image was what the new ESDP
sought above all to distance itself from, by making a clean break. Yet the extent
to which the WEU’s politico-military acquis was usefully drawn upon, as appro-
priate, during ESDP’s formative period can be shown to have been considerable
– however little was said about it at the time.
Where perhaps a clean break was most important was the need to invent a com-
pletely new military structure, embedded within the political union which is the
EU, and which would be acceptable to all. On the one hand, it had to dovetail
into the EU Council’s General Secretariat as a new and strangely different Direc-
torate-General; for this to happen, a clear line needed to be drawn from the
previous NATO/WEU Brussels mould.177 On the other hand, the military as
well as political establishments in the Member States and their outposts in Brus-
sels needed all to be comfortable with the eventual outcome; something for
which WEU had at least tried to prepare the ground.178 Here, the main challenge
was the need to develop the mindset of many of the NATO military representa-
tions in Brussels, which became double-hatted to the EUMC, towards what was
for them this new ‘beast’ – the political and partly supranational union of the
EU. This process was greatly eased for those delegations that decided to estab-
lish a defence section, headed by a deputy military representative, to work
within their national delegation to the EU and to provide close support to their
EU ambassador (‘permanent representative’).
177. For further details of the development of the politico-military interface in the EU, see Graham
Messervy-Whiting, The Politico-Military Structure in Brussels: capabilities and limits, Geneva Centre for
Security Policy: Geneva, September 2003.
178. As noted earlier, WEU in the 1990s became the first purely European institution to allow defence
ministers to meet around the table together with foreign ministers, and to hold Chiefs’ of Defence meet-
ings. One aim was to help build defence ministries’ confidence in WEU, although this never succeeded in
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The successful teaming of the full spectrum of civil-military capabilities, so as
truly to capitalize on the EU’s unique capability to bring onto the tee the whole
golf bag of political, diplomatic, trade and development, judicial, military and
civilian tools for security-building and crisis management, remains the elusive
‘holy grail’ of the Union’s external action dossier. The Lisbon Treaty has made
the latest attempt to promote it through the formation of the European External
Action Service (EEAS) under Catherine Ashton, the double-hatted EU Council
High Representative/ Commission Vice-Chairman.179 From this perspective,
perhaps one of the most important tasks for the nascent EU Military Staff from
2000 onwards was to assist in the progressive development of a security and
defence culture at the EU’s heart. Here, the WEU with its flexible and inclusive
membership categories played an invaluable familiarization role in the prepara-
tion of politico-military staffs in countries that were to accede later to the EU.180
The effects have been spread beyond Brussels, inter alia, by the growing range
of courses provided by the ‘virtual’ European Security and Defence College, a
concept discussed at WEU during the 1990s but realized by the EU as a network
of national academic bodies. One of the most positive features of this high-level
educational process is that many civilian officials, police and other experts
attend the ESDC side by side with national and central military personnel.181
Another of the top priorities for the EU’s nascent interim Military Staff (iMS)
was to establish informal contact with the other multinational military staffs in
and around Brussels: in WEU during its close-down, and in NATO. WEU was
a very high priority since the EU was initially inheriting the Petersberg tasks
under their WEU definition and it was important, whilst discarding the ‘unsat-
isfactory wheels’, not to re-invent any of the good wheels in addressing them.
The first meeting between the Head of the EU’s interim Military Staff and the
Director of the WEU Planning Cell took place in April 2000; further informal
meetings between the two Staffs took place every couple of months over the next
year. Such meetings had, at that time, to be informal because of the political
sensitivities about such contacts in some of the EU Member States and in some
of the WEU Nations, and because of institutional frissons between the two
bureaucracies. The only rational approach to designing ESDP capabilities and
179. Pre-Lisbon EU initiatives had included: the formation of informal Crisis-Response Coordination
Teams (CRCT) to bring Commission experts together with the civilian and military experts in the Council
Secretariat; a new civil/military cell within the EU Military Staff; a new chain of command for civilian
ESDP operations based on the establishment of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)
within the Council Secretariat, headed by a Civilian Operation Commander; and a re-vamped DGE IX
within the Council Secretariat to continue to deal with the ‘horizontal’ issues (concepts, capabilities, train-
ing, etc.) of civilian ESDP and the ‘pol-civ’ aspects of crisis-management, including the preparation of the
crisis-management concept.
180. Not least in developing the abilities of diplomatic and defence officials to speak both English and
French as working languages.
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structures was to start from a clean sheet of paper and adopt best practice in
each field wherever appropriate, whether this came from an international or
national politico-military organisation. In practice, this is indeed what was
done;182 but sadly, in some EU quarters any reference whatsoever back to WEU
practice was regarded as anathema.
On the other hand, the WEU Military Staff’s relationships with NATO military
staffs were not particularly helpful in facilitating the development of the EU
Military Staff’s relationships with them. NATO personnel had often tended to
view the WEU as a sort of troublesome junior sibling, to whom the lip service
of occasional good family manners had to be extended. It seemed therefore
wiser for the EU military to start afresh with NATO staffs, again through the
medium of informal contact pending the resolution of political and institutional
difficulties. Such informal military-to-military meetings developed and contin-
ued – for nearly three years until the final unblocking of the EU-NATO Berlin-
plus arrangements – as the principal way for the practitioners to prepare them-
selves to implement the political decisions to come183 Indeed, when the EU-
NATO Agreement was eventually signed off in December 2002, only some
twelve weeks remained for the planning, preparation and mounting process to
take place to enable the EU to launch Operation CONCORDIA, its first-ever
military operation and an operation having recourse to NATO assets and capa-
bilities, on 31 March 2003.
The line of inheritance from WEU’s activities to ESDP can be seen to be more
positive and direct in a number of more specific military/operational fields that
will now be reviewed in more detail: operational planning; actual operations;
logistics; command, control and communications; force capabilities; intelli-
gence; and crisis management exercises and training.
Operational Planning: The operational planning that the WEU Planning Cell
was authorised by the WEU Council to undertake in ‘normal times’, i.e. prior to
the development of a particular crisis in which the WEU Council took an inter-
est, was essentially generic planning for the so-called ‘Petersberg operations’. A
catalogue of such plans was developed and, by the Spring of 1998, had been
authorised for release ‘at 28’, to include all the WEU observer and associate
partner nations. This stood the iMS in particularly good stead as it set about
182. For further details of the development of the EU’s military staff, see Graham Messervy-Whiting, ‘The
Interim Military Staff of the European Union’, RUSI Journal, London, December 2000. For comparison,
the EUMS was initially designed as a 140-strong staff drawn from the then 15 EU Member States (2001);
in 1998, the WEU MS was around 55-strong from 12 WEU Nations.
183. For further details of the development of EU-NATO relations during this period, see G. Messervy-
Whiting, ‘The Growing EU-NATO Relationship: Beyond Berlin’, The International Spectator, Vol XL,
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developing a similar range of plans for the EU. Indeed, one of the key early
recruits to the iMS was an officer who had been one of these plans’ authors in
the WEU.
Operational Experience: By the Spring of 1998, WEU’s principal crisis manage-
ment operation, the Multinational Advisory Police Element in Albania (MAPE)
had attained a strength of some 60 police officers from 20 participating coun-
tries, backed by 30 local staff.184 Experience gained in all aspects of mounting,
then running, such a police training mission in a challenging Western Balkan
setting was carried forward into the ESDP context, since many of the key police
and military personnel involved in the planning and conduct of the EU’s first-
ever ESDP operation, the police mission (EUPM) to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
were former MAPE personnel.185 (The more general importance for ESDP of
operational definitions and concepts developed by WEU has been covered in the
last sub-section.)
Logistics: One of the focuses for logistic planning in the WEU was strategic
mobility, without which forces could not be deployed rapidly on crisis-manage-
ment operations. A strategic mobility concept was adopted within the WEU and
this work was picked up in the EU, with the focus on attempts to coordinate
strategic air transport movement and assets. European states (later joined by
Canada) progressively developed: the Franco-British European Air Group, then
the European Air Group, the European Airlift Coordination Centre, the Euro-
pean Airlift Centre (joined by the European Sealift Centre), becoming in July
2007 the Movement Coordination Centre Europe, based at Eindhoven. In July
2010, four EU Member States formed the European Air Transport Command,
pooling their fixed-wing air transport fleets.
Command, control and communications: The WEU developed the medium of
an annual conference for all the HQs offered up by the nations for possible use
in crisis-management operations, as a means of exchanging information and
improving mutual understanding of policies, plans, capabilities and procedures.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were developed, agreed, adopted and
revised as a result of experience gained on exercises. Again, this work was very
184. WEU’s MAPE mission was mounted in May 1997 ‘within the framework’ of the Italian-led MPF
operation known as Operation Alba, on which see note 57 above.
185. As already noted, MAPE was the first and only WEU operation to appoint an Operational as well as
a Force Commander, and it is noteworthy that its Operational Commander of MAPE from 1999-2001,
General Pietro Pistolese of the Italian Carabinieri, later commanded the EU Border Assistance Mission in
Rafah from 2005-2008. For the general development of European thinking on police missions see Renata
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useful as a checklist when similar SOPs came to be drafted for the EU’s ESDP
operations186.
Forces: As already noted, WEU developed a catalogue of the forces made poten-
tially available by nations for Petersberg tasks, the ‘Forces Answerable to WEU’
(FAWEU).187 This catalogue was updated annually, analysed by the Planning
Cell and the identified capability gaps notified to the politico-military authori-
ties.188 By the Spring of 1998, the FAWEU database contained a menu of some
2600 sea, land and air units from 24 of the 28 WEU nations. Developing such
a catalogue of potentially available forces was tasked as a very high priority to
the iMS, with work starting in earnest as early as April 2000, only a few weeks
after its first officer walked through the door of the Justus Lipsius, the EU Coun-
cil’s HQ building. That the iMS was able to issue its first provisional Helsinki
Headline Goal Catalogue in July 2000 was thanks principally to the profession-
alism and hard work of a couple of its officers with recent force development
expertise in the WEU Military Staff.
Intelligence: The WEU Planning Cell’s small Intelligence Section was producing
weekly intelligence summaries, based on intelligence released to the WEU by
seven of its ten full member nations, as part of its tasking by the WEU Council
to monitor and assess the situations in Albania, the Great Lakes region of Africa,
former Yugoslavia and Somalia. Although the EU Military Staff’s (EUMS) Intel-
ligence Division was designed on a ‘clean sheet of paper’ basis, the experience
gained, both in Member States and in Brussels, in handling politico-military
intelligence in a European multinational setting was not lost and one of the
EUMS design team was the former head of the WEU’s Intelligence Section.189
Experience gained in setting up a Situation Centre (SITCEN) for the WEU was
also invaluable in developing a truly joint civil-military SITCEN for the EU,
initially a joint enterprise between the EU’s Policy, Planning and Early Warning
Unit and the nascent iMS.190 Early contact was also made, in the Summer of
186. For a snapshot of WEU’s operational development as at 1997, see Graham Messervy-Whiting, ‘The
WEU’s Operational Development’, RUSI Journal, April 1997.
187. The initial FAWEU database was difficult to use as a planning tool, because national responses
ranged in scope from making all conventional forces ‘answerable’ (United Kingdom) to listing generic-
only capabilities e.g. ‘three armoured regiments’ (France). See Jean-Philippe Roux, op.cit. in note 57
above, p.65 and pp. 162 et seq for an in-house French view of the national politics behind this process.
188. This work was later developed into an annual defence planning review, carried out in conjunction
with NATO’s annual review, and the specific WEU audit of capabilities in carried out in 1999 (section IV
above).
189. For further details of the design of the military intelligence function within the EU, see Graham
Messervy-Whiting, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the European Union’. In Jess Pilegaard (ed.), The Politics
of European Security, Danish Institute for International Studies: Copenhagen, 2004.
190. Graham Messervy-Whiting, when Director of the WEU Planning Cell in 1998, was invited to give a
personal briefing to the Secretary-General of the EU Council, then Jürgen Trumpf, on the WEU’s work in
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2000, between the EUMS and the WEU’s Satellite Centre (SATCEN), to ensure
that a working relationship could be developed as soon as possible and well
prior to the SATCEN’s eventual transition to becoming an EU body.
Crisis Management Exercises and Training: The WEU had worked up a compre-
hensive set of crisis management procedures, which it practised annually
through a series of exercises termed CRISEX. These involved both civilian and
military staffs in Brussels and in capitals and took considerable preparation and
planning. Rolling five-year exercise programmes were drafted for politico-mili-
tary approval by periodic meetings of exercise experts from all the WEU
nations, with representatives from NATO’s civilian and military staffs invited as
observers. Exercise planning has long lead times and the exercise planners in the
nations and in NATO, a bit like the nuclear planners of old, constituted a rela-
tively small team of cognoscenti versed in the intricacies of this black art. Exer-
cising first the EU’s new politico-military structure, then its interface with capi-
tals, then with military-strategic level HQs and with NATO, were vital early
steps in the development of the EU’s operational capability. It was therefore
critical that the EU’s small new team of exercise planners could dovetail quickly
into the existing multinational network. It did so in no small part by being able
to build on this work done within the WEU. One of the early recruits to the iMS
was an exercise expert from a Member State which was also a NATO Nation.
As to training, the WEU had developed a catalogue of facilities, such as training
areas, which WEU nations were prepared to make available to the forces of
other WEU nations. This work was later carried forward in the EU for the forces
of Member States.191
6.2. Has anything been lost?
The list under this heading cannot be long, and is certainly shorter than it would
have been in the early 2000s, as many things that the EU failed or declined to
import from WEU at the start were later re-invented in more or less satisfactory
forms. In these cases, it is maybe the losing of time and energy that can legiti-
mately be regretted. In more substantial terms, however, at least three areas
stand out where positive aspects of WEU’s work and existence have not yet
found their continuation in an EU framework, and face relatively serious obsta-
cles to their translation there.
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The first of these relates to one of the core themes of this whole paper: the
demise of the simple, deep, and equal intra-European collective defence obliga-
tions contained in the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the MBT. Enough has been said
already to show that the Lisbon Treaty is quite a different animal and that, in
particular, the European Union of today does not share the character of a set of
allies all equally bound together by international legal commitments and by the
constitutional and other internal provisions flowing from them. How far this
matters for Europe as it stands today is a fair question, and will be discussed in
the next and final section.
The second point goes back to the discussion of WEU’s membership architecture
in Section III.1 above. It was exceptionally complex because WEU reflected the
reality of a Europe of variable geometry, and handled it in the most inclusive
possible style. It recognized the ‘Western’ identity, and the potential contribution
to security, of all nations who belonged either to NATO or the EU as well as
those within both, and those firmly in line for entry to the latter. It made the
bridge between Europe’s two stronger institutions in this participatory sense, as
well as with its two-way institutional partnerships. Together with the careful
balancing and unpublicized nuances of the different WEU statuses, these fea-
tures ensured that friction between Turkey and Greece within the organization
could be relatively easily contained and rarely led to serious stoppages of busi-
ness. It may be true, and has already been argued above, that WEU could afford
this kind of flexibility because of its low importance and modest outputs; per-
haps, too, because its routines left plenty of time and energy for relationship-
building.
However, with the final passing of the WEU Assembly – which took inclusive-
ness to extremes – the contrast of NATO’s and the EU’s relative rigidity is left
standing out all the more sharply. It is inevitable that each of these institutions
should reserve formal decision-making for its full members only: a situation
that makes the challenge of a Turkish veto and a Cypriot veto respectively
almost insuperable, failing a change in the states’ own attitudes. Yet it is not
immediately clear why the EU, so profligate in its proclaimed ‘partnerships’
worldwide, could never consider a special military relationship with non-EU
European Allies beyond the niggardly provision for ESDP consultations with
‘the Six’.192 Nor is it a given that the six EU non-Allies taking part in EU-NATO
cooperation could never be offered a status that would distinguish them from
the motley range of other members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership, or from
other ad hoc troop contributors benefiting from NATO’s Politico-Military
192. This was the 2000 formula, but the Six were reduced to Three with the Central Europeans’ achieve-
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Framework.193 The fact that the EU and NATO are so reserved towards each
others’ ‘extra’ members is not the smallest sign of the serious creases still
remaining to be ironed out in their mutual relations.
Third and last is the question of the ESDA/WEU Assembly itself. If WEU’s des-
tiny was to pursue an ultimately elusive chimera – ‘European defence’ – the
Assembly was also fated to attempt something where 20th century realities com-
bined to frustrate it, namely the democratic oversight of the conduct of defence.
Still today, at both national and institutional level across most of Europe, the
sites of ‘hardest’ defence competence and activity are those where parliamentary
scrutiny is most limited and any notion of co-decision most remote.194 The point
can be made by comparing the powers wielded respectively by the NATO Par-
liamentary Assembly and the European Parliament, or by considering the EP’s
own variable grip from CSDP across to core Community issues. The WEU case
fits perfectly into the spectrum as one where an Assembly won considerable
scope for initiative and influence, but over an institution whose activities were
hardly worthy of the effort, skirting as they did – at best – around the margins
of real military achievement. The same dismal logic was taken to an extreme
after the shut-down of the WEU Council, when the Assembly became arguably
more productive than ever but with no executive partner left to relate to. That
outcome was in fact foredoomed as soon as the year 1999 passed without a
formula being found for constructive coexistence with the EP: but only now,
with the Assembly’s closure, can the final cost be assessed. Bluntly put, the like-
lihood of a new national parliaments’ network gaining any real traction on
CSDP developments is as slim as that of the EP itself being granted real compe-
tence any time soon.
Does that matter, or was the whole of the Assembly’s life a pointless detour? To
dismiss it so hastily would be too cynical, just as the case of WEU itself. Inter-
governmental and limited in scope though it may be, the CSDP is more than just
an aggregate of national decisions take by traditional national logic on crisis
management doctrine, capabilities, planning and actual missions. The simple
fact that so many EU nations today find themselves contributing to operations
that lack all historical logic or direct security relevance for themselves is witness
193. The Politico-Military Framework defines the conditions and procedures under which any and all
non-Allied nations contribute to NATO operations. NATO agreed at its 2010 Summit on a review of the
Framework to be completed in time for the NATO defence ministers meeting in June 2011.
194. There are exceptions in some European nations that require more explicit parliamentary approval
for warlike actions and/or sending forces abroad, but these formal powers have to coexist with the grow-
ing pressure for rapid collective decisions on NATO and EU operations. On the challenge of parliamen-
tary scrutiny in the EU context see Hans Born et al, Parliamentary Oversight of ESDP Missions, DCAF
Policy Paper No 28, Geneva: Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008, text at http://
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to the fact that something new has been created since 1999, and that it shares at
least some properties and values of the broader European integration process.
Expecting all national parliaments to grasp fully what is happening is as unreal-
istic as expecting all national politicians to be able and willing to explain it to
them. In short, there are gaps in the oversight of collective action that can only
be filled by collective scrutiny; and if they are not allowed to be filled, both the
notions of democratic control and balance, and the chances for European pop-
ulations to offer active buy-in and support will end up the poorer.
Moreover, the WEU Assembly’s existence had useful by-products and process
effects that seem most unlikely to be replicated any time soon. Its committees
carried out conscientious and detailed research, with the help of qualified staff,
often over long periods and on some issues that were inadequately monitored
elsewhere, such as the technicalities of missile defence, satellite systems and the
relevance of space to defence in general.195 Their regional studies also main-
tained a high standard, while Assembly members’ double-hatting with the
Council of Europe Assembly ensured they were never blind to ethical, humani-
tarian and arms control issues. By inviting delegations from Central and Eastern
Europe, Russia and the Western Balkans into its proceedings at the earliest pos-
sible moment, the Assembly helped to spread skills and good practice as well as
personal networking to the parliamentarians of the new democracies. Just as
with the WEU Council’s work in the 1990s, it has seen not a few of its alumni
from such circles move on to high positions in the countries concerned. These
were not dramatic or widely advertised contributions, but they were real, and
must be added to the tally of the real losses to be weighed in the balance on 30
June 2011.
195. The work of the Assembly’s Aerospace Committee in these fields was much appreciated by the Satel-
lite Centre, for which such analysis and policy guidance remained directly relevant after the EU transfer.79
7. IN CONCLUSION: WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND 
DOES IT MATTER?
Even WEU’s fondest partisans would find it hard to deny that it probably did
more for Europe’s practical defence cooperation by surrendering its operational
role to the EU in 1999 than it ever achieved by its own efforts. A brief counter-
factual exercise may help to drive home the point. Had WEU struggled on for
another decade as the only potential mounter of European-led military opera-
tions, it is impossible to imagine nations agreeing to the same 23 missions that
were actually launched in the ESDP framework from 2003 onwards. The biggest
single obstacle would have remained the lack of political confidence in the
organization, coupled with capitals’ limited knowledge and appreciation of its
idiosyncratic ways. If the EU had tried to use WEU as a tool under its full polit-
ical control – as in the Treaty of Amsterdam formula – for executing more seri-
ous operations than MAPE, the clash between the memberships and procedures
(including funding methods) of the two organizations would surely have become
intolerable before long. It is equally stretching credibility to imagine NATO, or
the USA as a nation, entrusting valuable military assets to WEU’s hands in the
belief that the latter could adequately take the place of SFOR. Further, while
WEU could design a police operation with command requirements roughly
analogous to military ones, it would have lacked the expertise and connections
to make a success of the new functional types of mission that the EU experi-
mented with from 2004, including border management and security sector
reform. More generally, the new start under an EU aegis allowed a surge of
creativity, starting with the Barnier Committee’s work at the European Conven-
tion196 and continuing up to the Lisbon Treaty’s security provisions, that was
fed by intra-EU dynamics and drew on greater political energies than WEU itself
ever could have mobilized.
To balance this recognition, however, it is fair to recall those important limits on
EU success that have already been touched on in sections V and VI above. The
fact that most ESDP (now CSDP) missions have been non-military, and that the
military ones have been inherited from NATO, conducted in parallel with
NATO (like Atalanta), and/or very modest in scope tells its own story. So does
the scepticism now setting in about whether the EU Battle Groups scheme,
launched in 2004, can produce real tools for rapid operational response as dis-
196. Antonio Missiroli called the resulting draft constitutional treaty an ‘enabling text’ (rather than a
restraining or defining one) for European defence; see his comment of October 2004 at the EU-ISS web-
site, http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/analysisbooks/select_category/10/article/the-constitutional-
treaty-enabling-text-for-foreign-policy-and-defence/?tx_ttnews[pS]=1072911600&tx_
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tinct from getting nations to focus usefully on their complementarity and spe-
cialization.197 As already argued, the integration of the EU’s new military tool
with the vast range of others at its disposal has been slow and difficult; and the
launch of the EEAS – itself suffering a painful teething period – is unlikely to
revolutionize matters if only because some of the largest relevant capacities and
funds remain outside it.198 Finally, it is hardly necessary to stress how disap-
pointing the European performance has been in terms of creating or even main-
taining the necessary military capabilities, despite updates of and attempts to
tighten up the original prescripts of the 1999 Headline Goal.199 Many recent
studies200 have shown that aside from inadequate spending – where the EU has
signally failed to motivate the poor performers, and now sees even its strongest
nations wielding the knife – the pace of force restructuring for 21st-century
tasks has also been slow and uneven and progress in specialization weak. The
reasons include the still widely divergent military cultures, civil-military rela-
tions, security perceptions and priorities of European nations even within the
‘old West’, let alone the extended spectrum created by enlargement.201 To be
completely fair, of course, one should note that NATO has been nagging many
of the same countries to try harder for more than six decades, supported by the
full weight of the USA, but with equally little to show for it.
Amid all the debates over blame and cause for these deficiencies, a point is occa-
sionally made that cuts through to the heart of the matter: it is difficult for any
entity to have a common defence policy – let alone common management of
defence forces – without a common foreign policy. One could even argue that it
is wrong, since the military instrument should be under civil control and serve a
political end. NATO in the Cold War had at least a powerfully-motivated com-
mon security policy, on issues that were central to the survival of a democratic
Europe at the time, to back its closely integrated management of allied defence
assets. A lot of its difficulties and changes of course since 1990 have been driven
by the search for a replacement, within the narrowing fraction of the modern
security spectrum that its nature and competences allow it to address. The EU
197. Tommi Koivula, ‘The Origins and First years of the European Union’s Battlegroups’, Kungliga Krigs-
vetenskapsakademiens Handlingarna och Tidskrift (Proceedings and Journal of the Swedish royal Acad-
emy of Military Science), Vol. 1, 2010.
198. For example, matters like humanitarian assistance, development aid, and the use of EU trade and
financial sticks and carrots remain in the competence of various parts of the European Commission. Most
aspects of the EU’s internal security and border control are also handled outside the EEAS, making it hard
to coordinate external and internal strategies and to develop multi-use resources for both purposes.
199. An update known as Headline Goal 2010 was adopted in 2004, see http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsU-
pload/2010_Headline_Goal.pdf.
200. Well-documented examples are Nick Witney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy, as
in note 170 above, and Bastian Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition
and Reality, IISS Adelphi Paper 397: London, 2008.
201. The issues here have not advanced much since they were analysed in Alyson J.K.Bailes, ‘European
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occupies practically the whole of the rest of the spectrum, as well as now owning
a limited military tool; but the common foreign and security policies it has thus
far constructed remain (for the most part) adjuncts to, not replacements for, the
national equivalents and are typically strongest in the fields least directly related
to members’ survival. Even after the Lisbon Treaty’s changes, the building of a
‘common Union defence policy’ is cast in the latest consolidated Treaties on
European Union and on the Functioning of the European Union202 as something
for the future. The EU’s relevance for its countries’ and citizens’ safety is more
direct, and not uncommonly a matter of life and death, in non-CSDP fields like
disease and disaster management, border control and internal order, or environ-
mental policy: but using common defence assets for these purposes remains an
unexplored issue, still sensitive even after the language opening a way for it in
the new Treaty’s Article 222.
To recall the history of the common defence idea however is also to raise the
question whether its historical purpose has passed. If it is a mistake to re-fight
the last war, it is also unfair to judge institutions by how well they might have
fought it. The need for old-fashioned territorial defence in Europe is not obso-
lete but is most keenly felt today by a minority of EU and NATO members,
while the overall priority for this continent has clearly swung from military
towards non-military dimensions of security. So long as NATO remains true to
its residual task in this respect and the USA is willing to help, might it not be
positively foolish for the EU to go on struggling to keep the MBT notion of
‘European defence’ alive: thus running the risk of more adversarial relations
with neighbours and placing perhaps intolerable strains on its internal consen-
sus, let alone all the resource implications? At least one EU member country,
Denmark (though ironically one with an opt-out from CSDP) has moved far
towards a post-modern defence posture where two tasks for its armed forces
dominate: crisis management abroad, and support for civil security at home.203
Would that be such a bad model for the EU as a whole to cultivate? It certainly
fits like a glove the way that the Lisbon Treaty wording has turned out, whether
that was in its drafters’ minds or not.
Lest such a conclusion sound too complacent, it could clearly be one for the
short to medium term only. The security issues looming largest for Europe in
2011, such as economics, energy prices, climate change and the ferment in the
202. English-language version at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML.
203. This orientation began in 2002 and is reflected for example in Denmark’s internal Defence Agree-
ment for 2005-9 (text available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers.html) which contains the sentence:
‘There is no longer a need for the conventional territorial defence of the Cold War’. That this conclusion
did not make Danish forces any the less robust is shown by the prominent role they have played in IFOR/
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Arab world, clearly cannot be solved by military means but that will not neces-
sarily apply to their successors. While it probably will remain in Europe’s inter-
ests – given especially the rise of China – to keep a low and non-provocative
strategic profile overall, it seems more likely than not that need will arise for
selective uses of quite tough military force and/or for other dimensions of fur-
ther defence integration. Migration and border control would be one area to
look to for such dynamics, as would manmade and natural disasters on a tran-
snational scale, or urgent crisis management tasks (including on Europe’s own
borders) where for some reason larger partners are unwilling or unsuitable. It
would be wrong to rule out the possibility that a decisive push forward could
come from the industrial and technological front under conditions different
from today’s, but perhaps evolving from the economic aftermath of 2008. The
largest variable is of course the one most sensitive to speculate about, namely
the future attitude of the USA and fate of NATO.
If even some of these visions prove correct, future historians of Europe may be
able to see the renunciation of the MBT, the final closure of WEU and the dimin-
ished ambitions of Lisbon as actions clearing the way for a new phase in Euro-
pean construction, not just ending an old one. What will arise under the new
dispensation, however, seems unlikely under any scenario to be a repeat of his-
tory, or to convert the European Union into a puissance comme les autres.204 In
one of the 1998 publications for WEU’s anniversary, Wyn Rees argued that
those who tried to curb European defence ambitions in the 20th century were
not helping the longer-term balance between US and European defence efforts
or the smooth succession from the old NATO to a new security order. ‘Britain’s
preoccupation with preventing a challenge to NATO may have contributed to a
longer-term US dissatisfaction with its allies that they can ever aspire to a more
significant international role’.205 Under an even longer historical scenario, it
may turn out that six decades of cohabitation with the USA in NATO have
displayed to the Europeans all too clearly the kind of defence model that they
cannot copy in practice, arguably no longer need, and perhaps should not even
want in principle.
204. A power like any other.
205. G Wyn Rees, ‘Setting the Parameters for European Defence: The UK and the WEU’ in Deighton and
Remacle (eds.), The Western European Union, 1948-1998: from the Brussels Treaty to the Treaty of
Amsterdam, as in note 9 above.83
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